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1. Benjamin M. Friedman
Financial markets are an integral part of the modern economy. The
many and varied activities of financial markets both mirror and induce
events in the economic system at large. Only rarely, however, do they
serve as ends in themselves. Instead, they facilitate earning and spend-
ing, saving and investing, accumulating and retiring, transferring and
bequeathing—all activities at the core of economic life. In principle
people could do all of these things without financial markets. In practice
well-functioning financial markets enable people to do them more effi-
ciently, and few economic events take place without financial counter-
parts. Financial markets in fact constitute an essential vehicle through
which the millions of different participants in the nonfinancial economy
continually interact with one another.
The needs and resources, as well as the objectives and concerns, that
people bring to financial transactions are always changing. Greater pref-
erences for homeownership, reduced concerns for providing for one's
own or one's children's future, or the desire to take advantage of a new
production technology, will influence what people seek from the finan-
cial markets and hence what takes place there. New public-policy initia-
tives, and the persistent advance in the technology (especially commu-
nications technology) on which the financial markets rely in conducting
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their own business, may also effect change in the financial market.
Moreover, because every transaction has two sides—a buyer and a seller,
or a borrower and a lender—changes in what some people bring to the
financial markets necessarily imply changes in what others find there.
Hence financial markets act to transmit, not just absorb, the chain of
events that originates in the nonfinancial economy, and in so doing they
also importantly influence these events. Observing the financial markets
therefore provides an additional perspective for understanding nonfinan-
cial developments, even if the more basic origin of those developments
is itself entirely nonfinancial.
The experience of the American financial markets in the era since
World War II, when compared to the corresponding prewar experience,
presents both continuities and contrasts. A time-traveler from 1940, or
even 1900, would probably feel more nearly at home on first disembark-
ing in the financial markets than in most other major arenas of 1980
American economic activity. He would immediately recognize major
classes of financial market participants and their chief activities, includ-
ing banks taking deposits and making loans, insurance companies
spreading risk and investing in securities, corporations borrowing to
finance capital spending, and individuals both saving for their retirement
and borrowing to buy houses. The chief items issued and exchanged in
these markets are still currency and deposits, stocks and bonds, bills
and IOU's. Even the principal financial events that are news today—
large government financings, episodes of tight money, stock market ral-
lies, or bulges in the corporate underwriting calendar—are happenings
that attracted attention forty and in some cases eighty years ago.
Much of this immediate familiarity, however, would pertain to the
surface only. Behind the sameness of the players and their working
vocabulary, in many respects the American financial markets are per-
forming (or misperforming) their various functions differently today
than they did years ago. Some changes have reflected the changing re-
quirements placed on the financial markets by the nonfinancial economy,
while others have reflected government actions, and in a few cases the
primary impetus to change has been innovation within the financial
markets themselves. The pace of change has not been uniform either.
Some differences between today's financial markets and those of forty
years ago represent a contrast between the prewar years and the post-
war period as a whole, but others represent instead the ongoing process
of change that has occurred throughout the postwar era.
The object of this essay is to gain an overview of developments in the
American financial markets since World War II, with particular atten-
tion to changes that have occurred either between the prewar and post-
war years or within the past several decades. Inevitably such an effort
must be selective. The primary emphasis here is on the interaction be-
tween the financial markets and the nonfinancial economy, in the sense11 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
of the demands that the nonfinancial economy has placed on the finan-
cial markets and the ways in which the financial markets have responded
to these demands. In addition, much of this essay focuses on the evolv-
ing role of government in the financial markets and on the changes that
it has brought about. Questions pertaining to the internal organization
of financial markets and financial institutions, and to financial innova-
tions per se, are also important, but they will receive less attention here.
Section 1.1 briefly sets the background for this analysis by reviewing
some significant differences in the underlying economic climate between
the prewar and postwar periods. Section 1.2 examines in detail the
changes that have taken place in the financing of the economy's nonfi-
nancial activity. Here the dominant trend of the postwar period has been
the increasing tendency toward an economy financed by private rather
than public debt. Section 1.3 explores changes in the ways in which fi-
nancial markets have met these needs, with particular attention to the
role of financial intermediaries and changes in patterns of intermediation.
The dominant trend of postwar developments in this regard has been a
continuing increase in the economy's reliance on financial intermedia-
tion which, together with a series of innovations, has reduced barriers
and frictions interfering with efficient capital allocation. Section 1.4
focuses on changes in the role of government in the financial markets.
The major expansion of the federal government's financial activities
during the postwar years has been in guaranteeing and intermediating
the private sector's debt, as well as in regulating private financial trans-
actions. In addition, section 1.4 provides a brief qualitative account of
the ways in which both the conduct of monetary policy and its percep-
tion by financial market participants have evolved during the postwar
period. Finally, section 1.5 summarizes the principal conclusions of this
survey and reemphasizes the interconnections among them.
1.1 Changes in the Underlying Economic Climate
Although the focus of this essay is on changes in financial markets,
it is helpful to begin by noting briefly a few of the major changes that
have taken place in the underlying climate of nonfinancial economic
activity.
1 Three such changes are of particular relevance for understand-
ing what has happened in the financial markets.
First, the American economy in the postwar era has enjoyed much
greater stability and prosperity than in the earlier decades of this cen-
tury. Despite widespread early fears that "secular stagnation" would
follow the country's demobilization after World War II, real output and
incomes in the American economy in the postwar era turned out to be
both stronger and steadier than in the corresponding prewar experience.
As the first two columns of table 1.1 show, the postwar years—espe-










Measures of United States Economic Conditions




















































Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Standard and Poor's, and U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics. This table is in part adapted from Baily (1978).
Note: Data are means and standard deviations, in percentage per annum.
average (as measured by real gross national product) but also a smaller
variability of that growth. The pattern of the business cycle, indicated
in table 1.2 by the peak-to-trough decline in real gross national product
for the thirteen cycles that occurred during the past sixty years, also
highlights the increased stability of the postwar period. On the whole,
the economy's downturns have been both shorter and shallower.
2 Fur-
thermore, not only has the economy during the postwar period experi-
Table 1.2 Timing and Severity of United States Business Cycle Downturns








































Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Notes: Peak and trough dates from National Bureau of Economic Research refer-
ence cycles; real GNP decline in first seven recessions shown based on annual Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts data (comparison of 1946 over 1944 for 1945
recession); real GNP decline in last six recessions shown based on quarterly Na-
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enced less severe recessions on average, but until 1973 the trend ap-
peared to be toward progressively less severity. After the recessions of
1953-54 and 1957-58, a decade-and-a-half elapsed before another
downturn amounted to as much as half of their fairly modest magni-
tudes.
This enhanced stability of the real economy has both affected and
been reflected by financial values. As columns 3 and 4 of table 1.1
show, equity prices in the postwar period, especially until the 1970s,
have been less variable than in the prewar period. There have also been
fewer nonfinancial corporate bankruptcies since World War II. There
have been far fewer bank failures, and—until 1974—essentially no
failures at all of large banks.
The realization that the postwar American economy had entered an
era of stability and prosperity, instead of returning to the years of chaos
and depression, gradually altered both business and consumer thinking
in important ways. In addition, the emergence of the United States as
the world's dominant military superpower, with attendant responsibilities
and privileges in the political and economic spheres, only contributed
further to the sense of confidence and expanding horizons. The resulting
new perceptions of growth opportunities and new attitudes toward risk-
bearing in turn played a major role in bringing about the changing pat-
terns of corporate finance and personal saving that are the subject of
section 1.2 below, as well as some aspects of the changing patterns of
financial intermediation that are the subject of section 1.3.
A second major feature of the postwar American economy that has
importantly affected developments in the financial markets has been
price inflation. Whether by cause or by accident, the economy's new-
found real prosperity and stability did not come without costs, and
among these costs the most readily apparent to almost all of the econ-
omy's participants has been the acceleration and increasing volatility
of inflation during the second half of the postwar period (see cols. 5 and
6 of table 1.1). The postwar period at first brought an improvement in
the stability of prices as well as real incomes, as the rapid and volatile
inflation of the immediate postwar years gave way to price movements
that were on balance both slower and steadier, especially in the early
1960s. The improvement, however, proved only temporary. Beginning
in the mid 1960s prices (and wages) rose more rapidly, leading in time
to two episodes of double-digit inflation in the 1970s. Moreover, the
faster average rate of price increase during the most recent decade has
itself been more volatile.
It is not the purpose of this essay to analyze the reasons for the
accelerating postwar American inflation. The focus here is rather on the
effects of this new development on the financial markets. Because the
greatest acceleration of inflation has come only within the past decade,14 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
many key substantive questions about the effects of inflation remain
unresolved. Even so, it seems clear already that some of the important
financial changes discussed in sections 1.2 and 1.3 below have been due
at least in part to the increasing awareness on the part of individuals
and businesses of inflation per se, as well as to the rising average interest
rate levels that inflation has brought. In addition, several changes in the
role of government discussed in section 1.4 have also come about largely
as a result of either or both inflation and high nominal interest rates.
Finally, a third feature of the postwar American economic climate
that is useful to bear in mind in analyzing this era's financial market
changes is the shifting character of the international equilibrium (or dis-
equilibrium). From the beginning of World War I onward, the Western
world's international economic balance was highly precarious, and inter-
national mechanisms were important in propagating economic distur-
bances as well as in heightening their severity.
3 In the early years after
World War II it looked as if the world economy was at last—or, in the
opinion of some who recalled conditions before World War I, again—
relatively free from this source of instability. After World War II the
world had accepted a de facto dollar standard, and it maintained this
convenience even after the return to convertibility of key European
currencies in 1958. In addition, until the early 1960s the recovering
European economies continually sought both more dollars and more
American goods, so that the United States enjoyed not only a strong
balance of payments but also the confidence that came from knowing
that other countries would gladly absorb dollars in payment for their
goods if the American payments balance were not in balance.
This situation changed as the postwar period advanced. America's
trading partners increasingly became competitors, and tough competitors
at that. Balance-of-payments surpluses changed to deficits. Discussions
of how the United States could satisfy the familiar "dollar shortage"
disappeared, to be replaced by questions of what, if anything, the United
States could do to relieve the "dollar overhang." In the 1970s volatility
in the foreign exchange markets again became a major concern, this
time with a weak rather than a strong dollar as the center of attention.
Questions about the future of the dollar's role in international trade and
finance became widespread, especially after the abandonment of dollar-
gold convertibility in 1971 and the gradual move to a de facto system of
"floating but managed" exchange rates during the next several years.
The effective cartelization of the world oil supply in 1973 brought a
new wave of payments imbalances and highly skewed accumulations
of international reserves, this time far greater in magnitude than any
recent experience. On balance, the trend toward ever greater stability
in the international economic environment in the first half of the postwar
period reversed itself in the second half, although even in the 1970s the15 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
situation was far from what it was in the interwar years, and the con-
tinuing presence of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
provide a measure of safety that was not there before. This advance and
then retreat in the stability of the international economic system, and
simultaneously in the strength of the American position in it, have also
helped to mold a number of the major changes that have taken place
in the American financial markets during this period.
In sum, real economic stability and prosperity, accelerating price in-
flation, and a more stable but somewhat deteriorating international
equilibrium have lain behind much of the development of the American
financial markets in the postwar era. Just within the past half decade,
however, public confidence in the continuation of the first of these three
factors has weakened noticeably. In part this reduced confidence has
reflected the growing awareness of inflation and international events,
together with a mounting sentiment that these processes must not con-
tinue unabated. To whatever extent conditions fostering inflation and
a weak dollar had been a source of rapid economic growth, the public
has inferred that actions taken to curb them will probably trim the econ-
omy's average real performance too. The unanticipated magnitude of
the 1973-75 recession, coming as it did after two decades of damping
of the economy's business cycle, also exerted a major impact on people's
thinking. So too did the series of oil price increases imposed by the
cartel. To whatever extent the reliance on inexpensive and plentifully
available energy supplies had been a source of rapid growth, the public
has feared that both price and quantity actions taken by the foreign oil
producers would limit and disrupt future growth. Even simple extrapo-
lations of economic growth on the basis of purely domestic developments
such as labor force and productivity also suggested slower growth ahead,
since by the 1970s the postwar baby boom had matured, the birthrate
had fallen sharply, and the trend rise in productivity had suffered at
least one downward shift.
4
Moreover, economic events have probably not been the sole cause of
the decline in confidence in America's economic prospects that set in
during the 1970s. Loss of the Vietnam War, apparent erosion of Amer-
ican influence in world affairs, failure to meet domestic social objectives
set in the 1960s, increased emphasis on pollution and other intangible
costs typically associated with the economic process, and the political
trauma of Watergate all contributed to the feeling, widely reported in
surveys of business and consumer opinion, that the future looked less
bright than the postwar past.
The chief reason why it is useful to emphasize here this most recent
apparent shift in attitudes toward the nation's economic climate and
prospects is that it provides a clear warning against projecting, as a
forecast, any simple continuation of the postwar financial developments16 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
described in the remainder of this essay. Within only a decade—a rela-
tively brief interval in the context of the overview attempted here—the
American public has sharply changed its perception of the stable growth
and prosperity that have been perhaps the central features of their econ-
omy's postwar experience. Events may yet prove them right or wrong,
but financial behavior responds powerfully to attitudes and perceptions
as well as realities. Especially for changes in financial markets, analyzing
the past is not equivalent to predicting the future.
1.2 Changes in the Financing of Economic Activity
Individuals, businesses and governments sometimes engage in finan-
cial transactions directly with one another, although more often one or
more intermediaries stand between them. Nevertheless, because the needs
of nonfinancial entities to borrow and lend, to issue liabilities and hold
assets, to render and receive payments, constitute the essential raison
d'etre of financial markets, in assessing changes in financial markets
over a long period of time it is useful to begin by abstracting from the
financial intermediation process and directly examining changes in the
liability issuing and asset holding behavior of the economy's nonfinancial
participants.
1.2.1 The Postwar Rise of the Private Debt Economy
The single development in the American financial markets since World
War II that has been most striking from this perspective has been the
rise of the private debt economy. Individuals and especially businesses
have almost continually increased their degree of reliance on debt in
relation to their basic nonfinancial activity. Corporations have relied
more on both negotiated loans and market debt issues, in comparison
to equity either issued externally or retained internally, to finance their
ownership of productive assets and working capital. Individuals have
relied more on mortgage credit to finance their houses, and on consumer
credit to finance their ownership of durables and even their current con-
sumption. As a result, the indebtedness of the American economy's
private sector has risen substantially.
It is essential to ask at the outset whether this pervasive increase in
private indebtedness that has taken place during the postwar period has
also represented a change in the nonfinancial economy's total propensity
to issue debt liabilities (and hold debt assets). The answer is a straight-
forward negative. The total amount of debt issued by nonfinancial bor-
rowers in the American economy has in fact remained remarkably
stable in relation to economic activity throughout the postwar period.
5
Hence the great rise in private debt has mirrored a substantial decline,
relative to economic activity, in public debt. Although state and local17 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
governments have increased their debt somewhat, an enormous decline
(again, relative to economic activity)—in the federal government's out-
standing debt has predominated. Hence the postwar rise of the private
debt economy has come largel yas the counterpart of a falling off of
federal indebtedness.
Figure 1.1 and table 1.3 indicate the general dimensions of the post-
war movement to private debt.
6 Figure 1.1 plots, for the years 1918-78,
the total outstanding credit market debt issued by the economy's non-
financial borrowers, scaled as a percentage of nonfinancial economic
activity as measured by gross national product. The figure also plots the
respective components of this total debt ratio according to major cate-
gories of nonfinancial borrowers in the economy: the federal govern-
ment, state and local governments, businesses, and households. Table
1.3 presents for closer inspection the underlying data for the postwar
years, further distinguishing between corporate and noncorporate busi-
nesses and also including, as a memorandum item, debt issued in Amer-
ican markets by foreign borrowers.
7
The key aspect of the American nonfinancial economy's use of finan-
cial markets that stands out sharply in figure 1.1 is the relative stability
of its total debt outstanding despite the wide variation of the several
components that together comprise the total. Apart from a one-time
adjustment associated with the fall of prices at the end of World War I,
the nonfinancial economy's reliance on debt, scaled in relation to eco-
nomic activity, has shown essentially no trend over the past sixty years.
At 143 percent as of year-end 1978, the debt ratio was virtually un-
changed from 142 percent in 1921. Nonfinancial borrowers' outstanding
Fig. 1.1
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Outstanding debt of United States nonfinancial borrowers.18 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/ A. W. Clausen
debt rose significantly in relation to gross national product only during
the depression years 1930-33, when gross national product itself not
only was well below trend but also was falling too rapidly for the pay-



























































































































































































































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes'. Data are year-end credit market debt totals as percentages of fourth-
quarter gross national product, seasonally adjusted, at annual rate. Detail may
not add to totals because of rounding.19 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
down of debt to keep pace.
8 Otherwise the economy's total nonfinancial
debt ratio has remained roughly steady throughout this period. Indeed,
as table 1.3 documents in greater detail, the debt ratio has been espe-
cially steady during the most recent quarter-century, exhibiting only a
slight upward trend and a small amount of cyclically due to fluctuations
of gross national product around its growth trend.
9 From this overall
perspective, therefore, the years since World War II have largely repre-
sented a continuation of the prewar era.
It is interesting to speculate about the underlying economic behavior
that has held the economy's total outstanding nonfinancial debt so
steady in relation to its nonfinancial activity. Several different kinds of
behavior, not mutually exclusive, may have contributed to this phenom-
enon. First, the risk of default typically prevents either individuals or
businesses from borrowing much in excess of their ownership of (explicit
or implicit) collateral, and physical assets constitute the only such col-
lateral that most nonfinancial borrowers can provide. To the extent that
private wealth holders in the economy seek to maintain their net worth
in relation to their incomes by accumulating more physical assets as
they own fewer government-issued financial assets, their ability to issue
their own debt will rise as the predominance of government-issued debt
declines. Alternatively, some private borrowers may be able to issue as
much debt as they want in relation to their incomes, but may also recog-
nize that their liability for future tax payments to support the govern-
ment's debt service obligations makes the government's debt in some
ways equivalent to their own. As their indirect obligations to help
service government-issued debt decline, therefore, they become willing
to incur an increasing amount of direct obligations for their own debt.
Finally, since financial intermediaries must issue their own liabilities
approximately in proportion to whatever assets they hold, the amount
of debt liabilities that the nonfinancial economy, in total, issues and the
amount of financial assets that the nonfinancial economy, in total, holds
must be about equal. If private wealth holders in the economy have
steady demands for financial assets in relation to their incomes, then
the decline of government-issued debt will clear the way for the market
as a whole to absorb more private debt, so that this apparent stability
on the borrowing side of the financial markets in reality simply mirrors
a more fundamental stability on the lending side. Regardless of the rela-
tive importance of these (and possibly other) kinds of economic be-
havior in explaining the stability of the economy's nonfinancial debt
ratio, however, that stability has now remained one of the major-regu-
larities of the economy's performance over a long period of time.
1
0
In sharp contrast to the steadiness of the American nonfinancial
economy's overall reliance on debt, the debt issuing behavior on the part
of specific categories of nonfinancial borrowers has shown widely diver-20 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
gent patterns. Here the ongoing postwar trend toward ever less federal
government debt and ever more private debt in relation to gross national
product marks a sharp break from the immediately preceding years.
During the 1920s the government was gradually repaying the debt bur-
den it had assumed during World War I,
1
1 and in these years the private
sector was increasing its relative indebtedness. During the 1930s, how-
ever, the ratio of the government's debt to gross national product in-
creased by a factor of two-and-a-half (from 18 percent in 1930 to 45
percent in 1940), and during World War II it increased by yet another
two-and-a-half (to 119 percent in 1945). The financial system absorbed
this rapid relative growth of government indebtedness at first by a tem-
porary increase in the total nonfinancial debt ratio, and then by a sharp
reduction in outstanding private debt in relation to economic activity.
Since World War II, however, the federal government has again been
"repaying" its debt—not by actual repayment from budget surplus, but
by the growth (in recent years, mostly the inflation) of economic activ-
ity—so that in 1978 the ratio of its debt to gross national product was
again down to 28 percent, almost identical to the value in 1918. From
the perspective of its total absorption of resources from the financial
markets, therefore, the government's posture during the bulk of the post-
World War II period has mostly resembled that of the 1920s and has
stood in contrast to that of the 1930s and the war itself.
The postwar rise of the private debt economy, following as it did the
decline in reliance on private debt during the 1930s and the war years,
has mirrored the change in the federal government's behavior. Both
businesses and individuals have participated in this postwar resurgence
of private debt. The outstanding debt of businesses, which declined in
relation to gross national product from 123 percent in 1932 to 29 per-
cent in 1946, has risen in the postwar years to 50 percent in 1978 (in
comparison with 84 percent in 1921). The debt ratio for households,
which first rose from 15 percent in 1921 to 34 percent in 1932 and then
declined to 11 percent in 1944, has risen to 52 percent in 1978. On a
short-run basis the data, especially for businesses, exhibit modest cycli-
cal variation in a direction which partly offsets the cyclically of the
government's indebtedness. Nevertheless, over the postwar period as a
whole, the trend toward increasing reliance on debt by the private sector
has been clear.
In sum, the sustained large-scale turn toward private debt has been
one of the principal ways in which the American financial markets in
the postwar period have changed, at least in comparison to their more
immediate prewar experience. An important question, which this essay
leaves unresolved, is whether this resurgence of private debt has pri-
marily constituted merely a return to "normality" after the aberration
of the depression and the war or, instead, a shift to a greater "normal"21 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
indebtedness than that which prevailed half a century ago. Both factors
have no doubt contributed at least to some extent. That the years 1930-
45 constituted an aberration, and that a large part of the postwar trend
has represented a reversal of that aberration, is certainly plausible
enough. Moreover, as the discussion below brings out, after the war the
relative indebtedness of some categories of nonfinancial borrowers rose
steadily for one or two decades but then reached a plateau for some
time, perhaps indicating a completion of the reversal process and re-
attainment of the relevant prewar (and pre-depression) norms. Never-
theless, the plateauing of businesses' relative indebtedness in the past
few years may have been a reflection of cyclical factors rather than
longer run forces, and, after a hiatus of over a decade, households have
begun to increase their relative indebtedness once again. Even apart
from the evidence of experience itself, there are a priori reasons for
believing that the progressive development of intermediation in the
American financial markets, discussed in section 1.3 below, may have
created an environment that is indeed consistent with a higher "normal"
private debt ratio than that which characterized the prewar economy.
1.2.2 Specific Nonfinancial Borrowers' Debt-Issuing Behavior
Before going on to examine changes in patterns of intermediation and
in asset-holding behavior, it is useful to consider the way in which pri-
vate debt has come to play this greater role in the financing of economic
activity by focusing briefly on the postwar borrowing experience of the
principal specific groups whose needs the American financial markets
serve.
Businesses
Table 1.4 provides an indication of the changing absolute and relative
magnitudes of American nonfinancial corporate businesses' financial
needs by presenting data, in dollars and as a ratio to gross national
product, showing the average volume of corporations' uses of funds
during successive five-year segments of the postwar period to date (and
the three-year average for 1976-78). On the whole, the experience of
unincorporated businesses has been roughly similar to that of corpora-
tions in this regard. Corporate businesses' total uses of funds have grown
not only absolutely but also in comparison to the overall scale of the
nation's economic activity, although this increase has entirely come in
the 1960s and 1970s. Corporations' uses of funds for all purposes first
declined from an average 9.9 percent of gross national product during
1946-50 to 9.2 percent during 1956-60 and then rose by more than
one-fourth, reaching 11.9 percent during 1971-75. As the memorandum
item in the table shows, the nonfinancial activity of the corporate sector,




























































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of annual flows, in dollars and as percentages of annual
gross national product. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
throughout the postwar period, so that at least a part of this greater
relative use of funds in recent years may have reflected greater relative
nonfinancial activity. Within the overall total, use of funds for purposes
of physical investment—including plant, equipment, real estate, inven-
tories, and other real investments—has consistently dominated use of
funds for purposes of acquiring financial assets, and has also accounted
for most of the increase in total use in relation to gross national product.
Nonfinancial corporations have also consistently used some funds to
acquire (mostly nonliquid) financial assets, thereby acting in part as
financial intermediaries.
Against this background of corporate businesses' needs for funds in
their ongoing ordinary nonfinancial activity, table 1.5 presents five-year
average data, in dollars and as percentages of total sources of funds,
showing how corporations have financed these needs.
1
2 After World War
II the balance of corporate financing first shifted toward internally gen-
erated funds including both depreciation allowances and undistributed
profits. Beginning in the early 1960s, however, it shifted back toward
external funds, including both debt and equity issues. Internal funds23 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
provided an average 67 percent of corporations' total funds requirements
during 1951-55 and 69 percent during 1956-60, but then fell to only
55 percent during 1971-75. Also over these years depreciation allow-
ances increased in importance, and retained earnings (in other words,
internal additions of common equity) decreased in importance, among
the sources of internal funds themselves. To the extent that depreciation
allowances represent genuine consumption of the capital stock rather
than merely a way of redefining profits so as to render them exempt
from corporate income taxes, therefore, the decline in the contribution
of internally generated funds to the growth of the corporate sector has
been even more pronounced than these data suggest.
1
3 During 1974-77
the effects of the severe business recession and recovery temporarily
reversed the trend toward external finance, so much so that corporations'
outstanding indebtedness fell from 41 percent of gross national product
to 38 percent. Since then, however, corporations have apparently re-
sumed the financing patterns that had predominated for a decade-and-
a-half before the unusually deep recession.
A further feature of corporate financial behavior that emerges clearly
from table 1.5 is the increase in importance of debt and the correspond-




































































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of annual flows, in dollars and as percentages of total
sources. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.24 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/ A. W. Clausen
ing decline in importance of equity (until the early 1970s) among cor-
porations' external sources of funds. New issues of equity (net of retire-
ments) accounted for an average of nearly 15 percent of corporations'
external funds sources during the 1950s but then less than 5 percent
during the 1960s, and in three years out of ten during the 1960s equity
retirements actually exceeded new issues. Moreover, the data shown in
table 1.5 importantly understate both the magnitude and the persistence
of the shift to debt finance. What little equity issuance took place during
the 1960s typically represented initial public offerings of speculative new
ventures aimed at a segment of the investing public that was willing to
bear substantial risk. Established corporations largely avoided the equity
market. In addition, the bulge of equity offerings during the early 1970s
primarily represented only one sector of American industry (public
utility companies), and it consisted in large part of preferred shares
which are in many respects simply bonds that receive special tax treat-
ment for corporate investors.
1
4
Businesses' increasing reliance on debt financing has probably re-
flected several influences on corporate financial decision-making. To
begin, most American businesses emerged from World War II carrying
debt that was, in relation to their volume of production and profits, very
small in comparison with their prewar experience. As figure 1.1 shows,
nonfinancial business indebtedness in relation to gross national product
peaked in 1932 and then fell slowly during the remainder of the 1930s.
The most rapid decline, however, came during the war years, as the
overall business debt ratio fell from 63 percent in 1940 to 27 percent in
1945 (40 percent to 17 percent for corporations). It is at least possible,
therefore, that the entire subsequent increase to 55 percent at the 1974
peak (37 percent for corporations) simply represented a slow restora-
tion—which may not yet be complete—of a perceived normal indebted-
ness that has remained unchanged since before the war. Indeed, by
comparison with the standard of the 1920s, the postwar rise in corporate
indebtedness has been modest thus far.
Other, more specific explanations are also available, however. First,
any private borrower's willingness to incur debt liabilities presumably
reflects confidence in the ability to meet these obligations under a wide
range of plausible circumstances, including both those particular to the
borrower and those general to the economy. As business decision makers
became aware of the American economy's distinctly greater stability and
prosperity in the postwar era, they probably associated a smaller risk
with any given level of indebtedness in relation to either balance sheet
or income reference points. Second, the secular acceleration of inflation
and rise of nominal interest rates has provided a further incentive for
taxable borrowers to increase their indebtedness. As figure 1.2 shows,
on average nominal interest rates have about kept pace with inflation,25 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
% PER ANNUM
Fig. 1.2 Interest rates and price inflation.
so that "real" interest rates have remained roughly unchanged during
the postwar period. Given the deductibility of interest payments against
income for tax purposes, however, after-tax "real" interest rates faced
by corporate borrowers have been negative almost throughout this pe-
riod, and have become progressively more negative since the early 1960s
—exactly the period of greatest increase in the debt share of total sources
of funds.
1
5 Finally, at least throughout the 1960s, corporate financial
decision makers appear to have operated almost continually under the
opinion that equities were somehow "undervalued." Especially during
the 1960s the belief that equities were undervalued on a widespread
basis led not only to the paucity of new equity issues by major corpora-
tions but also to such developments as a wave of conglomerate mergers
largely financed by debt. In fact, as figure 1.3 shows, equity prices on
average had risen sharply during the 1950s and 1960s, both nominally
and on a price-adjusted basis. Since then there has been little trend











Fig. 1.3 Equity prices and the GNP price deflator.26 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
luctance to issue new equities in the late 1960s because of undervalua-
tion appears (with the benefit of hindsight) to have been misplaced.
Whatever its cause, the shift by corporations from internal funds gen-
eration to external financing and from equity to debt within that exter-
nal financing total, together with similar trends among nonincorporated
businesses, has been a major feature of the postwar American financial
markets. Table 1.6 presents data showing the total accumulation and
also the maturity composition of corporate businesses' outstanding debt.
These data show clearly that the large shift to debt financing beginning
in the mid 1960s also brought a slow increase in the short-term share
of the debt, thereby breaking away from the virtually fixed maturity




The substantial postwar increase in households' relative indebtedness,
shown in figure 1.1 and table 1.3, has probably reflected behavioral
influences analogous to those identified above as likely causes of the rise


































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of year-end credit market debt outstanding, in dollars
and as percentages of the annual total. Detail may not add to totals because of
rounding. Long-term debt, with a maturity of over one year, is measured approxi-
mately as bonds, multifamily and commercial mortgages, and 40 percent of bank
loans. Short-term debt is all other credit market borrowings, including mostly fi-
nance company loans, commercial paper, and the remainder of bank loans.27 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
in businesses' reliance on debt. Initially just the return to borrowing
standards that had prevailed before the war, then a changing perception
of tolerable debt levels as confidence in the economy's stability and
prosperity became widespread, and finally the growing after-tax incen-
tive for those in higher tax brackets to borrow as price inflation and
nominal interest rates rose together,
1
7 all contributed to individuals'
greater willingness to borrow.
Unlike businesses, however, individuals during the postwar period
have increased their outstanding debt well beyond the relationship to
gross national product that prevailed during the prewar years. House-
holds' outstanding debt gradually rose from 15 percent of gross national
product in 1921 to 24 percent in 1929, then temporarily rose somewhat
further in the early 1930s (when gross national product was well below
trend), but then stabilized again at an unvarying 25 percent throughout
1936-40. When individuals emerged from World War II with a debt
ratio of only 13 percent in 1945 (the low had been 11 percent a year
earlier), they presumably felt ample room to borrow heavily. Individuals
pushed their indebtedness relative to gross national product past the 25
percent prewar norm as early as 1952, however, and continued to in-
crease it virtually without interruption until 1964 when it reached 48
percent—a level at which it remained almost constant through 1975.
Hence it appeared that individuals had reached a new postwar capacity
level of tolerable debt. Just during the'late 1970s, however, individuals
once again began to increase their relative indebtedness. All of these
changes in households' indebtedness in relation to gross national product
have also represented changes in relation to personal disposable income,
which has claimed a steady average of 69 percent of the gross national
product, with no trend at all, throughout the postwar period.
Tables 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 present data for households comparable to
that shown in tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 for nonfinancial corporate busi-
nesses. First, table 1.7 indicates households' changing financial needs
by showing their total uses of funds for all purposes, divided between
current consumption of nondurable goods and services and all "invest-
ment" type uses—including new residential construction, outlays for
durable goods, and financial investment. Whether the evolution of indi-
vidual behavior documented in table 1.7 constitutes a case for change
or continuity within the postwar period is largely a matter of emphasis.
Nondurable consumption has remained a steady five-eighths of gross
national product, without any trend, since the early 1950s. Households'
total nonconsumption uses of funds remained roughly steady at one-
fifth of the gross national product until 1970, but has risen sharply
since then. Within this total, both durables purchases and residential
construction have held a steady relation to overall economic activity
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u £>29 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
doubled over the postwar years, rising from an average of 6 percent of
gross national product during the late 1940s and 1950s to 10-12 percent
in the 1970s. While it is important not to lose sight of the distribution
of assets and liabilities—the people who borrow are often not the same
ones who accumulate assets—on an aggregated basis the notion that
individuals have increased their borrowing (relative to economic activ-
ity) either to finance investment in houses and durables or to finance
current consumption turns out to be false. Instead, they have borrowed
more and simultaneously held more financial assets.
A comparison of households' total uses of funds versus personal dis-
posable income, shown as a memorandum item in table 1.7, indicates
that individuals have had to be net borrowers throughout the postwar
period. After showing little trend for a quarter-century, the shortfall of
disposable income from total uses of funds has increased sharply in the
1970s. The data in table 1.8 show how households have financed their
growing needs for funds.
1
8 Here again the data suggest a long period of
stability, followed by some change in household behavior either at the
beginning of the 1970s or perhaps the 1960s. Until then the balance
of saving and borrowing as sources of funds remained largely unchanged.






































































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of annual flows, in dollars and as percentages of total
sources. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.30 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
More recently individuals have relied more heavily on borrowing, includ-
ing both mortgages and consumer credit (primarily installment credit
19).
Table 1.9 indicates the accumulation and also the relatively stable com-
position of this expanding individual debt by type of borrowing. Subject
to some variation primarily associated with the pace of homebuilding
activity and the movement of house prices, home mortgages have ac-
counted for a fairly steady five-eighths of total household indebtedness
throughout the postwar period. Consumer credit has gradually shrunk
in relation to the total, while the relatively small amount of borrowing
in all other forms has gradually grown.
State and Local Governments
State and local government units gradually increased their outstanding
debt from 7 percent of the gross national product at the end of World
War II to just over double that in 1971 before allowing it to decline
somewhat in the 1970s. Once again, a major portion of this increase in
indebtedness constituted a return to prewar norms after the aberration
of the wartime years. During the 1920s the state and local government
debt ratio had slowly risen from 10 percent to 13 percent, and after






















































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of year-end credit market debt outstanding, in dollars
and as percentages of the annual total. Detail may not add to totals because of
rounding.31 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
At least until 1960, therefore, the postwar increase was merely a restora-
tion of the previous relative debt level. For the next decade outstanding
state and local government debt grew little further in relation to the
economy's nonfinancial activity, and in the 1970s it again declined to
well within its prewar range.
As table 1.10 shows, the leveling of the state and local government
debt ratio in the 1960s and its decline in the 1970s stand in some con-
trast to the relative size of state and local governments' nonfinancial
activity, which continued to grow vigorously through both the 1950s
and the 1960s, and leveled off but did not decline in the 1970s. State
and local government spending has been the single most rapidly growing
component of the nation's total spending since World War II. The great
surge in the provision of local public services during this period, much
of which was associated with the needs created by the postwar baby
boom, more than doubled state and local governments' purchases of
goods and services as a share of the gross national product. Only in the
1970s has this growth in spending leveled off, as the demographics have
shifted markedly and an increasing number of communities have all but
completed their basic social capital installations including schools, hos-
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of annual flows, in dollars and as percentages of annual
gross national product. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.32 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
The budget data in table 1.10 also show that state and local govern-
ments on average have typically kept their total receipts, consisting
primarily of tax revenues and federal grants, rising in pace with their
increasing total expenditures—including primarily purchases of goods
and services, plus small amounts of transfer payments and the excess
of interest paid over interest received.
2
0 Indeed, in the 1970s they have
consistently run surpluses.
2
1 Hence state and local governments' bor-
rowing, which has consisted almost entirely of long-term debt, has served
in large part to finance these governments' own investment in financial
instruments, especially Treasury securities. In 1978, however, the federal
government eliminated the right of state and local governments to earn
a positive "spread" by issuing tax exempt (and therefore lower yield)
securities in order to hold (without paying taxes) higher yielding Trea-
sury securities. Hence the relationship between state and local govern-
ments' debt issues and their budget surpluses or deficits may well become
closer in the future than it has been in the recent past.
Foreign Borrowers
Foreign borrowers have played a relatively small, though growing,
role in the American financial markets throughout the postwar period.
2
2
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, discussions of the American
balance of payments deficit, which people were just then coming to
perceive as a problem, often focused on the strength of the American
financial markets and on their ability to extend credit to finance the
growth of world trade and development. Even so, as the memorandum
column of table 1.3 indicates, outstanding debt issued by foreigners in
the American markets first equaled 5 percent of this country's gross
national product only in 1963, and it peaked at an only slightly higher
ratio after the imposition of capital controls the next year. Moreover,
throughout this period and into the 1970s, about half of the foreign
borrowing here took the form of loans from the federal government
rather than funds advanced by private investors. Foreign debt in Amer-
ican markets did not again reach the 1964 level (in relation to gross
national product) until 1974, after the removal of the capital controls.
The subsequent growth remained modest through 1978, although the
increasing amount of developing country debt owed to American banks
has recently raised widespread questions about these banks' exposure
to risks associated with foreign lending.
It is interesting to speculate about whether foreign borrowing would
have been a more important activity in American markets but for the
restrictive government actions taken in the 1960s to prevent capital out-
flows in the interest of maintaining a stronger dollar. From 1964 until
1974 the Interest Equalization Tax effectively prohibited the sale in the
United States of debt securities issued by foreign borrowers other than33 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
Canadian provinces and international institutions such as the World
Bank, and from 1965 until 1974 the Federal Reserve's so-called Volun-
tary Foreign Credit Restraint program limited lending abroad by Amer-
ican banks.
2
3 These two restrictions—along with the Commerce Depart-
ment's Office of Foreign Direct Investment program, which from 1965
to 1974 required American companies to finance abroad whatever funds
they were investing abroad, and the advent of effective interest ceilings
on domestic deposits (discussed in section 1.4 below)—probably pro-
vided the chief impetus to the rapid development of the Eurodollar and
Eurobond markets. Without these capital controls foreign borrowers
almost certainly would have done more financing in American markets,
and might have done much more. Since the removal of capital controls
the volume of both American banks' lending abroad and foreign issues
in the American bond market has picked up sharply, but the Euro mar-
kets, now that they are well established, remain the major immediate
source of dollar credits to most foreign borrowers.
2
4 In retrospect it is
clear that the capital flow restrictions imposed in the 1960s had the
effect of enhancing the competitive position of, for example, the London
financial markets over those in New York.
Federal Government
The federal government's reliance on the American financial markets
during the postwar period has largely constituted a return to the experi-
ence of the 1920s after the aberration of the Depression and the war
years. After World War II the government's outstanding debt fell stead-
ily in relation to gross national product until the mid-1970s—from 119
percent in 1945 to 56 percent in 1955, 37 percent in 1965, and a low
of 25 percent in 1974. Although the federal government's budget has
rarely been in surplus, only during the years 1949, 1953 and 1975-76
did the impact of business recessions on tax revenues and transfer pay-
ments enlarge the deficit to such an extent that the government did not
"pay down" the public debt in relation to (temporarily shrunken) non-
financial activity. Nevertheless, the other postwar recessions—in 1957-
58, 1960-61, and 1969-70—did produce some slowing, though not a
reversal, of the overall postwar decline in the government's debt ratio.
The combined effect of the relatively mild 1969-70 recession and the
especially severe 1973-75 recession has been on balance to halt much
of the decline of the public debt ratio in the 1970s, although the govern-
ment budget projections for 1979-81 that are available as of the time
of writing suggest that this decline may now be in progress once again.
Table 1.11 presents budget summary data relating the federal govern-
ment's financial needs to its nonfinancial activity. Apart from a one-time
jump at the beginning of the 1950s and subsequent fluctuations asso-


















































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of annual flows, in dollars and as percentages of annual
gross national product. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
ily in relation to gross national product throughout the postwar period.
Within the overall total, however, the mix between transfer payments
and direct purchases of goods and services has radically changed. Ex-
cept for a brief bulge during the Vietnam War years, the share of gross
national product claimed by federal goods and services purchases has
fallen ever since the early 1950s. By contrast, during this same period
federal transfers—including grants to state and local governments, social
security benefits, and all other income support payments—have risen
even more rapidly in relation to gross national product. As a result,
total expenditures (which also include the excess of interest paid over
interest received) have grown modestly in relative size, and their com-
position is now nearly two-thirds transfers and only one-third direct
purchases instead of the reverse twenty years ago.-
5
The federal government typically enlarges its portfolio of directly
held financial assets only slowly, so that its borrowing primarily reflects
the differences between its total expenditures and its total receipts from
tax revenues and social security contributions. After a large surplus
during the late 1940s and a small deficit during the Korean War years,
the federal government's budget was in balance on average during the35 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
late 1950s. Since then the budget deficit has averaged 0.5 percent of
the gross national product during the 1960s, nearly 2 percent during the
early 1970s and more than 2 percent during 1976-78. Even after allow-
ance for the enlargement of the deficit due to the severe 1973-75 reces-
sion, the federal budget deficit has shown a slow but steady tendency
to grow in relation to the economy's nonfinancial activity.
2
6 The result
has been the continual slowing—and in 1975-76 the temporary reversal
—of the decline in the federal debt ratio that has dominated the postwar
period thus far.
The maturity composition of the debt issued by the federal govern-
ment has also changed substantially during the postwar period, as table
1.12 shows. Federal debt management policy has not only stood in con-
trast to the pattern of wartime financing but has also undergone several
sharp breaks within the postwar years. Especially since the Federal Re-
serve System's abandonment of bond price stabilization at the beginning
of the 1950s, postwar debt management has mostly emphasized short-
term rather than long-term financing, driving the mean maturity of the
outstanding federal debt down from 113 months in 1946 to a low of
only 33 months in 1976. In two distinct periods, however, debt manage-
ment has gone the other way. During the early 1960s the government
lengthened its outstanding debt, from a mean maturity of 50 months in
September 1960, to 65 months in January 1965.
2
7 In addition, begin-
ning in 1976 and continuing through the time of writing, the government
has been lengthening its debt once again. The increase in mean maturity
from 33 months in January 1976, to 43 months as of September 1979,
represents about as rapid a rate of increase as the rate of decrease that
predominated on average during the previous thirty years.
1.3 Changes in the Working of the Financial Markets
How have the American financial markets in the postwar period met
the changing needs that the economy has placed on them? In any well





























Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Note: Data are mean values for December (September for 1979).36 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
developed financial system it is useful to distinguish the liability-issuing
and asset-holding activity which takes place directly between nonfinan-
cial participants in the economy, whose respective principal business
interests lie elsewhere, from that which takes place through an interme-
diary whose principal business is financial transactions themselves. In
general, changes in how financial markets work to meet the requirements
of the nonfinancial economy may represent some combination of changes
in the economy's overall degree of intermediation and changes in how
the intermediaries go about their business. In fact both aspects together
have accounted for changes in the American financial system during the
postwar era.
1.3.1 The Advance of Financial Intermediation
Throughout their history, but more so during the twentieth century
and especially in the years since World War II, the American financial
markets have undergone a shift away from direct transactions between
nonfinancial borrowers and lenders toward the intervention of financial
intermediaries.
2
8 The development of the commercial banking system
and of the life insurance industry in earlier years, and more recently the
great expansion of nonbank deposit institutions and both private and
public sector pension funds, have been important features of the devel-
opment of the American financial system.
In the postwar period the continuation and even acceleration of the
trend toward intermediated financial markets has hardly been indepen-
dent of the simultaneous rise in the economy's reliance on privately
issued debt. Instead, the two developments have been natural counter-
parts.
2
9 In comparison with default-free government obligations, risky
private securities impose both information and transactions costs that
encourage the economy's development of financial intermediaries. Hold-
ers (or potential holders) of private securities must first discover the
specific risks that individual claims against private issuers entail, and then
monitor these risks on an ongoing basis. These information costs are
especially large in the case of negotiated loans like home mortgages,
consumer credit, and bank loans to businesses. Not only economies of
scale but also the advantages of specialization favor delegating this in-
formation gathering and processing function to third parties. An equally
important function performed by financial intermediaries holding private
securities is the pooling of specific risks. In transforming the direct claims
that they hold into the indirect claims that they issue, intermediaries
economize on transactions costs so as to facilitate diversification by
enabling investors to own interests (indirectly) in a large number of
imperfectly divisible assets. In addition, by pooling many individuals'
and businesses' needs for liquidity, deposit intermediaries often change
the risk characteristics of the aggregate of assets to be held by issuing37 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
claims (often explicit or implicit demand claims) that have a shorter
maturity than the claims that they in turn hold. Similarly, pension and
insurance intermediaries change the aggregate risk structure that insured
parties face by pooling actuarial risks.
Individuals are the principal nonfinancial holders of assets that repre-
sent direct claims on other nonfinancial participants in the economy.
Individuals' continued willingness to hold such assets therefore consti-
tutes a retardant to the advance of financial intermediation, while their
reluctance to perform this function creates the basic need for interme-
diation. Figure 1.4 shows how American households have shifted the
composition of their financial asset portfolios during the postwar pe-
riod.
3
0 Households' aggregate holding of deposit-type liabilities of finan-
cial intermediaries have grown continually from the early 1950s to the
late 1970s, not only absolutely but in relation to overall nonfinancial
economic activity (and personal income). Households' claims on insur-
ance and pension reserves have also grown on balance during the post-
war years, although here the growth has been less steady because of the
effect of equity price changes on the valuation of these reserves (see
again fig. 1.3). By contrast, households' direct holdings of noninterme-
diated debt have declined in relative terms almost continually since
World War II, and their direct holdings of equity claims on business
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Fig. 1.4 Financial asset holdings of United States households.38 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
ing little overall relative trend.
3
1 Since the total size of households'
financial asset portfolios in relation to gross national product has also
shown no overall trend—first declining during the immediate postwar
years, then rising sharply in the 1950s, remaining steady through the
1960s, and declining in the 1970s—these patterns of growth and decline
in comparison to gross national product also correspond, for the post-
war period as a whole, to growth or decline in shares of households'
total portfolio.
Households' increasing preference for claims on intermediaries has
appeared even more pronounced from the perspective of their accumu-
lation of financial assets. Table 1.13 shows households' net acquisition
of various categories of financial assets, both in dollars and as a share
of the total. The two features of households' investment behavior that
stand out most sharply here are the dominance of deposits throughout
the postwar period and the change that took place at the end of the
1950s in households' net investment in corporate equities. Households
purchased more equity shares in corporations than they sold in every
year during 1946-57, so that the tripling in value of their direct equity
holdings over this period represented the combined result of capital
gains and positive net purchases. By contrast, households have sold
more direct equity shares than they have purchased in every year since
1958, so that capital gains have accounted for more than all of the sub-
sequent increase in total value of their direct equity holdings. Moreover,
allowing for the shift from direct ownership of equities to indirect own-
ership via mutual funds does not alter the fundamental picture of indi-
viduals' investment behavior. Households in the aggregate were net
purchasers of mutual fund shares during the rise of that industry in the
1960s, but not in sufficient quantity to offset the liquidation of their
direct equity holdings. More recently, they have been net sellers of both
direct equity holdings and mutual fund shares in every year since 1972.
The conclusion remains that equity price movements have accounted
for more than all of any increase in the value of individuals' equity hold-
ings. Because equity prices have fluctuated widely but shown little net
gain in nominal terms since the mid-1960s (see again fig. 1.3), indi-
viduals' aggregate equity portfolio has therefore shown no trend move-
ment in nominal value and has declined in relative value during the last
decade and more.
The shift of individuals' investment flows away from equities during
the second half of the postwar period probably reflects several consider-
ations in addition to the economies of scale and risk pooling noted
above as general advantages of intermediation. Changing birthrates, age
distributions, and income levels have all played some role. The increas-
ing government provision of health, education, and income security













s; VJ M V) O\
•-< O 't H (!) H
vo vo en vo ©_ en
l"~ © ••* © ^r <o
VO ^H
6 d
H n oq q N
O O O rn H t^ d w -H
© ©
O N On
S ~ VO O O
I I
o\ vd
o >n o v> o u-i
»n «r> vo vo r~ r~-
voivoivo JL
•<t >o >/-> vo vo r-
O\ O\ ^ O\ O\ O\
o o q o o p o
o o o o o o o
o © o © o © o
vi vo vo r~- r~ r~






<>a < JO40 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/ A. W. Clausen
people. The growing importance of workers' claims on future pension
benefits, including job-specific pensions in both the private and public
sectors and also social security, has in particular changed many people's
need to accumulate assets directly to finance their retirement.
3
2 Finally,
perceptions of the relative returns and risks—including especially infla-
tion risk—associated with different assets have also changed markedly
during the postwar period. After the unpegging of bond prices in 1951,
fixed-income securities became subject to market risk in addition to
inflation risk, and in the 1970s the inflation risk has increased dramat-
ically. As for equities, during most of the 1950s and 1960s, renewed
confidence in economic stability and prosperity lessened fears of any
collapse of values comparable to that of 1929-33, and in addition many
people regarded them as a "hedge" against price inflation.
3
3 Following
the rapid acceleration of inflation and the poor performance of both
equity prices and the American economy in the 1970s, however, pre-
vailing opinion has become progressively more skeptical both of the
economy's long-run growth prospects and of the usefulness of equities
as an inflation hedge.
3
4 As the correlations presented in table 1.14 show,
even during the 1950s and 1960s nominal returns on equities never
compensated fully for variations in price inflation.
3
5 Even so, the table
also shows that there has been a noticeable shift in the structure of asset
returns and risks in the 1970s.
Although individuals are the dominant nonfinancial holders of direct
claims on other nonfinancial participants in the economy, businesses
also advance a substantial amount of direct credit, both to individuals
in the form of installment and other consumer credit, and to each other






















































Note: Data in percentages per annum.41 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
in the form of trade credit and commercial paper. Even with the ready
availability of business credit cards and charge accounts, however, com-
mercial banks and finance companies have increasingly dominated the
consumer credit field. The share of outstanding consumer credit owed
to nonfmancial businesses (including corporations and others) has fallen
from just over one-third in the early 1950s to just under one-sixth in the
1970s. In addition, business lending via purchases of nonfinancial com-
mercial paper has remained relatively small, so that trade credit—typi-
cally equal to 15-18 percent of the gross national product, and mostly
borrowed and lent within the corporate sector—remains the primary
vehicle for businesses' holdings of direct claims on nonfinancial obligors.
Foreign investors have held a small but growing share of direct claims
on nonfinancial participants in the American economy throughout the
postwar period.
3
6 The growth of foreign holdings has been especially
rapid during the 1970s, as the persistent American balance of payments
deficit has transferred assets abroad, especially to member countries of
the international oil cartel. The rapid recent growth has proceeded from
a small base, however, so that foreign holdings still represented less than
5 percent of all direct claims against American nonfinancial obligors as
of year-end 1978. Nevertheless, the concentration of foreign (especially
foreign official) investments in specific instruments has made foreign
holdings of particular importance in some American markets. The year-
end 1978 share of federal government securities held abroad, for exam-
ple, was nearly one-sixth.
Figure 1.5 indicates the extent to which the increasing preference for
claims on intermediaries by individuals (and, to a lesser extent, other
nonfinancial investors) has shifted to intermediaries the task of meeting
the needs that nonfinancial participants in the economy have brought to
the American financial markets. As of 1978 individuals in the aggregate
remained the largest single class of holders of direct claims on nonfinan-
cial borrowers and share issuers—but only by virtue of their continuing
domination of the ownership of corporate equities. Because the direct
claims that individuals hold consist overwhelmingly of equities (see
again fig. 1.4), the household share of ownership of the total of direct
claims outstanding has varied with fluctuations in equity prices. Overall,
however, the household share has declined, as has the share held by all
other nonfinancial investors. As the share of direct claims on nonfinan-
cial entities held by all nonfinancial investors has declined, the share
held by financial intermediaries has correspondingly risen. Intermedi-
aries' holdings first accounted for the majority of all direct claims out-
standing in the American financial markets in 1969, and they have
remained the majority ever since.
Table 1.15 presents flow data indicating the even stronger postwar
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Fig. 1.5 Holdings of claims against United States nonfinancial sec-
tors (including equities).
nonfinancial participants in the economy. Here the main difference from
the pattern indicated in figure 1.5 is that these data exclude equity cap-
ital gains, which constituted most of the increase in households' equity
holdings until the late 1960s and more than all of the increase since
then. Apart from accumulating capital gains on equities, individuals and'
other private domestic nonfinancial investors have played only a small
and shrinking role in meeting directly the needs that nonfinancial entities
have brought to the financial markets.
3
7 In large part because of the
growing fraction of those needs that have come in the form of debt
issued by private borrowers, nonfinancial investors have instead accu-
mulated claims on intermediaries and have left to them the task of di-
rectly allocating the economy's financial resources.
1.3.2 The Role of Specific Intermediaries
The advance of intermediation in the postwar period has hardly been
uniform. The specialization of American financial intermediaries has
inevitably led to some playing more important roles than others, and
some experiencing more rapid growth than others, as the needs and
objectives of both borrowers and lenders have changed and as govern-
ment interventions have (intentionally or otherwise) favored first one
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Commercial Banks
The commercial banking system has long stood at the center of econ-
omists' interest in financial markets. Even today, despite nearly two
decades of increasing emphasis on nonbank intermediaries in financial
economics research,
3
8 discussions ranging from textbook descriptions of
the economy to professional evaluations of monetary policy often pro-
ceed as if commercial banks were the only intermediaries in the finan-
cial markets. This emphasis on the commercial banking system is under-
standable in part, in view of the special role that banks play in the
monetary policy process by virtue of their relationship to the Federal
Reserve System. In addition, in the past commercial banks were more
dominant in financial market activity than they are today. Before World
War II, banks' assets and liabilities dwarfed those of other intermedi-
aries, and before passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 commercial
banks also dominated the American securities business.
3
9 Until as re-
cently as the early 1970s, commercial banks enjoyed a monopoly on the
right to issue checkable deposits.
Since World War II the American commercial banking system has
approximately held its own in relation to the scale of nonfinancial eco-
nomic activity, but it has not participated in the economy's overall post-
war expansion of intermediation. The approximate stability of the
banking system's relative size is apparent in figure 1.5, and also in the
data on commercial banks' assets and liabilities presented in table 1.16.
The total size of the banking system in relation to gross national product
has shown essentially no trend during the postwar period. Put the other
way around, as figure 1.6 shows, there has been little postwar trend in
the "income velocity" of the broad M2 money stock, which consists of"
most commercial bank deposit liabilities (plus the public's currency
holdings), or in the corresponding income velocity of bank credit, which
consists of most commercial bank earning assets.
4
0 This relative stability
(actually a slow decline) in the postwar period stands in marked con-
trast to the prewar years when, over nearly a century, the size of the
banking system continually grew in relation to gross national product.
4
1
Within the stability of the overall totals, however, the postwar years
have also seen substantial shifts in composition on both sides of the
banking system's balance sheet. Among bank assets, the most significant
development of the postwar period has been the recovery of bank loan
portfolios and hence the general resumption of banks' traditional role
as "inside" intermediaries. In 1929 loans constituted 73 percent of bank
credit. During the depression and then the war years, however, the fall-
off in private debt issuing meant that, for all practical purposes, there
was little or no loan business to be had. By contrast, the federal govern-
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Fig. 1.6 Income velocities of monetary and credit aggregates.
financing it. By 1935 banks' securities investments exceeded their loan
portfolios, and in 1945 investments constituted 79 percent of bank
credit. Commercial banks simply were no longer very commercial. The
years since 1946 have largely consisted of a reversal of the 1930-45.
pattern, with bank loans exceeding securities investments in 1957 for
the first time in more than two decades and reaching 73 percent of total
bank credit as of year-end 1978.
In rebuilding their loan portfolios and deemphasizing their invest-
ments, banks have also both altered the mix of their lending business
and changed the character of their securities holdings. Although banks
remain a principal source of business credit, and commercial and indus-
trial loans are still the largest single category of bank lending, they no
longer dominate bank loan portfolios as they once did. Instead, mort-
gage credit and other consumer loans now comprise nearly one-third
of the total. Especially during the second half of the postwar period,
the widespread use of bank-issued credit cards has been a major factor
in banks' development of their consumer lending business. Moreover,
among business loans per se, the larger banks have increasingly become
a major factor in the intermediate-term credit market through the use of
explicitly longer maturity loans (in some cases up to ten years) and
revolving credits of an implicitly ongoing nature. Total bank investments47 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
have grown slowly since World War II, but because of tax incentives
banks have so concentrated their investments on state and local govern-
ment issues that, for a few years in the early 1970s, they held more of
these securities than of federal government debt.
4
2
Among bank liabilities, the two most significant changes that have
occurred during the postwar period have been the continual decline of
demand balances and increase of time and savings deposits, relative to
either total bank liabilities or gross national product, and the "liability
management revolution" that has greatly increased the larger banks'
reliance on "bought funds." As figure 1.6 shows, the income velocity
of the narrow Ml money stock, consisting of currency plus demand
deposits, has about tripled over the postwar years as a result of a com-
bination of influences including economies of scale in the public's hold-
ing of cash balances, the secular rise in nominal interest rates, and the
increasingly widespread use of credit cards and charge accounts.
4
3 This
persistent trend in Ml velocity stands in sharp contrast to either the
absence of any trend during 1910-30 or the steeply declining trend
during 1930-45. Hence only the strong growth of time and savings
deposits, including the new negotiable certificates of deposit that first
came into existence in 1961, has accounted for the much slower post-
war increase in the income velocity of M2. Large banks' growing use of
such liabilities as certificates of deposit, federal funds, Eurodollar bor-
rowings, commercial paper issues, repurchase agreements and so on—
instruments that in some cases represent the development of new finan-
cial markets since World War II—has not only changed banks' balance
sheets but also facilitated a major change in the feasible aggressiveness
of bank lending practices. The enormous postwar expansion of bank
loan portfolios, which banks have achieved in part through the competi-
tive use of such devices as loan commitments and medium-term credits,
would probably have been impossible if banks had simply continued to
follow the classic practice of treating their deposits (and other liabilities)
as determined by outside forces.
Finally, it is useful to point out explicitly that because of changes in
commercial bank organization, especially during the 1960s, the repre-
sentation of banks as having merely held their own during the postwar
increase in the American economy's degree of financial intermediation
relative to economic activity risks understating by a wide margin the
growing overall presence of commercial banks in the financial system.
After falling by more than one-half between 1920 and 1935, the num-
ber of American commercial banks has remained roughly steady at
about 14,000. The number of bank branches, however, has risen from
some 4,000 to over 32,000 during the postwar years, with most of
this growth occurring since 1960. Moreover, especially since the 1970
Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act, banks have increas-48 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
ingly gone into activities other than their traditional loan and deposit
business.
4
4 Although their direct participation in financial intermedia-
tion has not kept pace with the rising postwar trend, commercial banks
have increasingly enhanced their importance as more nearly full-service
financial institutions.
Nonbank Deposit Institutions
As is clear from figure 1.5, one group of intermediaries that has ac-
counted for much of the postwar increase in American financial inter-
mediation has been the nonbank deposit institutions including savings
and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions. The
public's strong demand for consumer-type time and savings deposits
has kept these institutions growing rapidly, not just absolutely but in
relation to economic activity, during most of the postwar period. In
fact, as figure 1.6 shows, their growth has even been great enough to
offset the relative decline of the commercial banking system, so that the
income velocity of the M3 money stock, consisting of M2 plus nonbank
deposits, has shown a modest downward trend since the beginning of
the data series in 1959. Moreover, when extrapolated backward this
trend appears to have been a continuation of the downward trend asso-
ciated with M2 during the prewar era when nonbank deposit institutions
were not of major importance.
Table 1.17 presents data for the individual deposit (or share) volume
and combined asset holdings of the three major groups of nonbank de-
posit institutions, first in relation to gross national product and then as
a share of the total assets of the three groups of institutions together.
The vast postwar expansion of the savings and loan industry stands out
clearly here. Between the early postwar years and the 1970s outstanding
savings and loan shares more than quadrupled as a percentage of gross
national product. By 1978 the amount of these shares equaled more
than twice the amount of mutual savings bank deposits and credit union
shares combined, and also equaled about five-sixths of the amount of
consumer-type time and savings deposits held at commercial banks. In
comparison with mutual savings banks, the primary factor underlying
the more rapid growth of savings and loan associations has probably
been mere geography; mutual savings banks are overwhelmingly concen-
trated in a few states, especially New York and Massachusetts, which
have experienced slower than average economic growth during the post-
war period. In comparison with commercial banks, the primary factor
has probably been the effect of government regulation, in that savings
and loan associations did not face deposit interest rate ceilings until
1965 and have enjoyed a one-fourth percent differential over commer-
cial banks since then. The growth of credit unions has been even faster

























































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of year-end amounts, as percentages of annual gross
national product and as percentages of annual total assets. Detail may not add to
totals because of rounding.
another example of rapid growth from a small base, and they remain by
far the smallest of the three groups of institutions. Mutual savings banks
are alone among the three groups in having failed to do more than grow
in pace with economic activity. Although mutual savings banks were
twice as large as savings and loan associations at the end of World War
II, savings and loans were equal in size in 1954 and more than three
times as large by 1978.
Because all of these nonbank deposit institutions operate under legal
and regulatory constraints governing the disposition of their asset port-
folios, their aggregate contribution to meeting the financial needs of
nonfinancial participants in the economy has followed a fairly predict-
able pattern. Savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks
typically invest some 80 percent and 70 percent, respectively, of their
assets in mortgages, so that these two groups together have become the
nation's leading provider of mortgage lending. As of year-end 1978,
savings and loans and mutual savings banks together held 45 percent of50 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
all outstanding mortgages (in comparison to 18 percent for commercial
banks, the next largest class of holders). These institutions are especially
predominant in the market for single-family home mortgages, account-
ing for 55 percent of year-end 1978 loans outstanding. Credit unions,
by contrast, have traditionally invested most of their assets in consumer
installment loans, and by 1978 they accounted for 14 percent of the
outstanding consumer credit.
As the discussion in section 1.4 below emphasizes, the history of
American nonbank deposit institutions in the postwar period has been
in large part a story of evolving financial regulation, including restric-
tions on these intermediaries' liability issuing as well as their asset
holding. In this context, what may well turn out to be two of the most
important changes affecting nonbank financial institutions within the
postwar era are only just in progress at the time of writing. The first is
the sudden acceleration of the erosion of the deposit interest rate ceil-
ings these institutions have faced since the mid 1960s, following the in-
troduction in mid-1978 of "money market certificates" bearing yields
set in relation to those on Treasury bills. Just by late 1979—that is,
after less than eighteen months—these new deposit certificates accounted
for more than one-fourth of all deposits at savings and loan institutions
and almost one-fourth those at mutual savings banks. The second
change is the expansion of authority to issue interest-bearing checkable
deposits, which nonbank deposit institutions and commercial banks in
the New England states received in several steps during 1972-76, and
the extension of which to the rest of the country is to be decided by
Congress in 1980. Both checking account authority and the freedom
from deposit interest rate ceilings are likely to increase greatly the de-
mand for claims on nonbank deposit intermediaries, although the impact
of the latter on these institutions' cash flows (and even solvency in some
cases) makes it a mixed blessing in the short run.
Nondeposit Intermediaries
Finally, as is also apparent from figure 1.5, a significant part of the
postwar increase in the American economy's degree of financial inter-
mediation has stemmed from neither commercial banks nor nonbank
deposit institutions but, instead, from intermediaries that issue only non-
deposit claims. There are many forms of such intermediaries operating
in the American markets, but the most familiar and important among
them include life and casualty insurance companies, private and public
sector pension funds, independent consumer finance companies and the
"captive" finance companies of nonfinancial businesses, equity and
money market mutual funds, real estate investment trusts, and security
brokers and dealers.51 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
Table 1.18 presents data, analogous to that shown above for the non-
bank deposit institutions, for three specific categories of nondeposit
intermediaries:
4
5 life insurance companies, private pension funds, and
state and local government pension funds. The reason for focusing in
particular on these three groups is not only that they are the largest of
the nondeposit intermediaries but also that their respective postwar ex-
periences reflect some interesting contrasts. Because the low interest rates
implicitly paid on the savings component of ordinary life insurance has
increasingly favored the use of group and other term insurance policies,
life insurance companies' total assets held and liabilities outstanding
grew little relative to gross national product during the first half of the
postwar period, and since then they have been declining in relative
terms. Moreover, the relative decline in these companies' life insurance
business has been even more pronounced, in that their growth in recent











































































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of year-end amounts, as percentages of annual gross
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manage for other businesses. As of year-end 1978 pension reserves con-
stituted nearly one-third of life insurance companies' total liabilities, up
from less than one-tenth in the early postwar years.
By contrast, both private and public sector pensions have experienced
extraordinarily rapid growth throughout these years. Tax incentives at
both the individual and corporate levels, business personnel policies
aimed at reducing worker turnover, features of the collective bargaining
process, and other corporate financial objectives have all combined to
favor the mushrooming of private pension liabilities since World War II.
During most of this period, however, businesses had (and many used)
broad latitude to incur pension liabilities without funding them. The
1974 Retirement Income Security Act has subsequently specified mini-
mum standards for the vesting of workers' rights to accumulated pension
benefits and for employers' funding of vested pension liabilities.
4
6 Even
so, businesses still have flexibility in choosing the actuarial assumptions
underlying the calculation of future benefits, the minimum required
amortization of unfunded vested benefits is very slow, and nonvested
benefits require no funding at all. Consequently, many businesses con-
tinue to carry substantial amounts of unfunded liabilities, so that private
pension funds' total assets as shown in table 1.18 substantially under-
state their liabilities.
4
7 This understatement has been especially great
during the 1970s when many private pension funds' asset portfolios, of
which in the aggregate about two-thirds is invested in equities, have
suffered an erosion in market value.
State and local government pensions, including both teachers' and
other employees' funds, have experienced similar postwar growth. Pub-
lic sector workers have the same tax incentive to use the pension mecha-
nism to spread income beyond retirement as do private sector workers.
Although public sector employers do not have the same tax incentives
as do private businesses, in many cases the political process has prob-
ably favored the use of pension compensation over current compensa-
tion, especially when there is no pressure to raise tax or other revenues
immediately to fund the accumulating pension liabilities. In fact public
sector pension funds have been and remain substantially underfunded,
so that the asset data shown in table 1.18 greatly understate their lia-
bilities also.
4
8 The continued growth of public sector pensions' assets
during the 1970s, in contrast to private pensions, reflects merely the
smaller share of assets invested in equities (about one-third in the ag-
gregate) rather than any difference in funding practices.
The asset mix of these insurance and pension intermediaries—and
hence their role in financing economic activity—has also undergone
important changes since World War II. Regulatory changes in the 1960s
allowed many life insurance companies to increase the equity portion
of their portfolios, and since the mid-1960s life insurers have largely53 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
withdrawn from direct home mortgage lending. State and local govern-
ment pension funds and especially private pension funds have even more
dramatically increased the equity share of their investments. Conse-
quently, these nondeposit intermediaries have increasingly become a
major source of both debt and equity funds for corporate businesses.
As a result of these portfolio changes, together with the rapid growth
of pensions and the (relative) stagnation of the commercial banking
system, insurance companies and pension funds combined have come to
dominate banks as holders of claims on the American corporate busi-
ness sector—despite banks' postwar emphasis on loans over investments
in government securities. In the early postwar years these intermediaries
held only slightly more claims on the corporate sector than did commer-
cial banks, but by the 1970s they held more than twice as much.
It is also important to distinguish the claims on business held by
banks, which are overwhelmingly in the form of short- to medium-term
loans, from the corresponding claims held by insurance companies and
pension funds, which consist mostly of long-term debt and equity securi-
ties. These nondeposit intermediaries have traditionally held some three-
fourths of all outstanding corporate bonds, and in recent years they
have also come to hold nearly one-sixth of all corporate equity. The
flow data in tables 1.19 and 1.20 give a further idea of these investors'
importance in providing long-term debt and equity capital to American
business corporations. In addition to accounting for much or all of the
corporate sector's net long-term bond financing throughout the postwar
period, since 1960 they have also accounted for more than all of its
equity financing, absorbing also the equity holdings liquidated by the
household sector. In sum, businesses' equity and bond financing has
become increasingly dominated by these investors. Given their high rates
of portfolio turnover, especially in comparison with individuals, equity
and bond trading has become even more so.
1.3.3 Financial Innovation and the Advance of Market Efficiency
With individuals doing less of the direct lending in the American fi-
nancial markets and specialized intermediaries doing more, it is not
surprising that many aspects of the working of these markets have
changed during the postwar years, and that most of these changes have
tended to reduce or eliminate barriers to the transfer of financial re-
sources and thereby to render the financial system more efficient than
before. One example of this evolution has been individuals' increasing
ability to diversify their holdings via mutual funds, pensions, and mort-
gage pools. Another has been their increased ability to escape interest
rate ceilings via negotiable certificates of deposit or money market cer-
tificates, and minimum size requirements via money market mutual



























































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of annual flows, in billions of dollars and as percentages
of total net issues. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
nesses to borrow abroad) as legal barriers have fallen. Especially in
conjunction with innovations exploiting new physical technologies, post-
war changes in financial intermediation have reduced many of the bar-
riers and frictions that interfere with the capital allocation process.
At least four kinds of friction-reducing changes bear explicit atten-
tion. First, wholly apart from the effective reduction of transactions
costs associated with increased intermediation, marginal transactions
costs in both the direct and the indirect senses have fallen irregularly
throughout the postwar period. The fee typically charged for negotiated
underwritings of high grade corporate bonds, for example, declined from
$10 or more per $1,000 bond in the early postwar years to $8.75 per
bond in the late 1950s and has remained unchanged at that level ever
since, although underwriting fees for competitively bid bond issues have
fallen more substantially in recent years. Bid-asked spreads have fallen
from $2.50 or $5.00 to $1.25 or even $0,625 per bond for actively
traded government bonds, and the feasible size of transaction at the
quoted prices has increased substantially for both government and cor-



























































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of annual flows, in billions of dollars and as percentages
of total net issues. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
York Stock Exchange have also declined to a typical $0.25 or $0,125
per share for most issues, instead of the $0,375 per share that was more
prevalent some years ago. Effective equity brokerage fees have typically
fallen as well, especially for larger trades, although under the fixed
minimum commission system the reductions usually took the form of
indirect rebates and services provided. Since the Securities and Exchange
Commission prohibited fixed minimum commission rates in 1975, aver-
age fees on large trades have fallen from $0.15 per share to only $0.08
per share (0.4 percent of principal value). Overall, as a result of
natural competitive forces in the financial markets, striking advances
in electronic communications and data processing technology, and spe-
cific regulatory actions, these and other direct transactions costs have
fallen sufficiently that the markets for what are traditionally regarded
as "nonliquid" instruments now in fact provide substantial liquidity.
4
9
In addition, indirect transactions costs at the margin have fallen during
the postwar period as nonfinancial businesses have increasingly invested
in sophisticated financial staffs, either "in house" or on a retainer basis,
and individuals have gained substantially more financial knowledge also.56 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
A second change which has been related to the decline in transactions
costs, and which has also served to make markets both more liquid and
more efficient in the sense of reducing barriers to financial allocations
and reallocations, has been the increasing trend toward negotiability of
financial assets. As table 1.21 shows, nonfinancial corporations and fi-
nance companies have on balance increased the negotiability of—and
hence the potential market for—both their short-term and their long-
term debt by substituting commercial paper issues for bank loans and
publicly offered bonds for directly placed bonds. In addition, a large
part of the postwar trend toward negotiability of financial assets has
occurred through the development of new financial instruments. Com-
mercial banks first introduced the negotiable certificate of deposit in
1961, and by the mid-1970s these certificates accounted for some one-
tenth of banks' total liabilities. Bank lending has also become more of a
straightforward market transaction and less closely tied to bank-cus-
tomer relations, as in many cases commitment fees have augmented or
replaced deposit balances as criteria for extending credit, and the greater
flexibility provided by banks' liability management practices has better
enabled them to accommodate fluctuating business credit demands (es-
pecially through the use of floating-rate loans). The introduction of
exchange-traded options and financial futures markets has facilitated
hedging and speculating investment postures that previously were either
impossible to achieve or possible only via expensive combinations of
long and short positions. The development in the 1960s of a secondary
mortgage market and the advent of mortgage-backed "pass-through"
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Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission and Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
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have correspondingly increased the range of investors prepared to con-
sider them.
The gradual and piecemeal removal of international barriers to finan-
cial transactions, including the American actions already noted above
as well as corresponding actions by other countries, has been a third
important factor in the postwar development of the American—indeed,
the world—financial system. One part of this process has simply been the
development of viable financial markets abroad. Most European coun-
tries did not even have currency convertibility for current transactions
until 1958 (Japan not until 1964). Convertibility for financial trans-
actions has come in individual pieces since then, and it is still incom-
plete although there is now so much convertibility that massive short-
run movements of short-term capital have become a major problem in
the international monetary system. Since the removal of the American
capital controls, both American and foreign borrowers may again choose
whether to raise funds in the American markets or abroad, American
banks may choose between domestic and foreign loans, and other Amer-
ican investors may choose whether to buy securities issued at home or
abroad. Other countries have also gradually eliminated analogous cap-
ital controls—most recently the United Kingdom in 1979. All of these
developments have improved the markets' ability to allocate financial
resources in comparison with the earlier situation in which banks' par-
ticipation in the Eurodollar market was the primary vehicle for interna-
tional capital flows, or even more the situation of the still earlier postwar
years before the reopening of foreign financial markets and the use of
modern communications technology to connect them with the American
markets. In addition, as the example of around-the-clock trading in
Eurodollars and Asian dollars suggests, the removal of international
financial barriers has also even further enhanced the overall negotiability
of many financial assets. The move to floating exchange rates in the
1970s, a subject that lies beyond the scope of this essay, has also been
an important part of this entire set of developments.
5
0
Financial innovation per se—whether due to technological, regulatory,
or entrepreneurial forces—has constituted a fourth major source of post-
war change enhancing the efficiency of the American financial system.
Given its low capital intensity and highly mobile (and well-educated)
labor force, the financial industry is typically able to adopt innovations
both more cheaply and more rapidly than can, for example, manufac-
turing or other production lines of business.
5
1 Many of the innovations
that have been so important in changing the structure and working
characteristics of the American financial markets have already appeared
in the discussion above. Other examples include such now standard
instruments as leveraged leases, variable-rate annuities, corporate bonds58 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
subject to call protection, and floating-rate debt issues, as well as instru-
ments that are only just now coming into use like graduated-payment
and variable-rate mortgages. Additional markets like those for federal
funds and commodity futures are not new in the postwar period, but
they now play a far greater role in the financial system than ever before.
Adoption of modern electronic technology has already facilitated such
innovations as remote terminal banking, and such far-reaching struc-
tural changes as the development of a semiautomated national market
system for equity trading or an electronic funds transfer system for com-
mercial banking are now visible on the horizon though not yet in place.
In every case, these innovations have acted to reinforce the continual
trend toward erosion of barriers and frictions that has marked the evo-
lution of the American financial markets since World War II.
Despite this cataloging of the reduction of costs and barriers that have
followed from the rise of intermediation together with innovation, how-
ever, it would be misleading to suggest that the American financial sys-
tem has yet (or will soon) realize economists' idealized conception of
a perfectly efficient mechanism for allocating financial resources. Many
imperfections remain. Perhaps the most striking example of the Amer-
ican financial markets' continuing shortcomings in this respect is the
failure, despite the experience documented in table 1.14, to provide an
investment vehicle that would (presumably, for a price) guarantee the
purchasing power of its holder's capital value.
5
2 In addition, the home
mortgage instrument remains a relatively inflexible instrument despite
recent innovations,
5
3 tax lock-ins remain important despite the changes
in inheritance taxes in 1976 and in capital gains taxes in 1978, pension
rights remain entirely illiquid, and most individuals face severe liquidity
constraints preventing their borrowing against future income in the form
of either wages or pension benefits. More generally, the gap between the
interest rates that most individuals earn on assets and pay on borrowings
is very wide. In sum, the postwar trend has indeed been toward more
efficient markets, but at least as of 1979 there is much room left for
further development.
1.4 Changes in the Role of Government
In addition to its reliance on the financial markets as a borrower
financing its current deficit, the federal government has played a num-
ber of other roles in the development of the American financial markets
since World War II. Regulatory actions and tax policies have resulted
in significant impacts on how the financial markets have been able to do
their job. The government's activities as a financial intermediary have
affected the allocation (and perhaps the total) of saving in the economy.
The monetary policy carried out by the Federal Reserve System has59 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
fundamentally shaped the postwar course not only of the financial
markets but of the economy as a whole. In sum, despite the decline of
the government's role as a direct borrower, the broader changes at work
during the postwar era have probably been in the direction of a growing
overall influence of government on the American financial markets.
1.4.1 Deposit Insurance and Government Regulation
The proliferation of the federal government's regulatory activities
since World War II has touched almost every part of the American
economy, and has brought important and far-reaching changes.
5
4 The
financial markets have been no exception in this regard. Some of the
most significant innovations in financial market regulation came during
the 1930s, as part of the society's immediate reaction to the excesses of
the 1920s and their effects during the depression. Others have come
since the war. On both counts, however, the postwar experience has
been significantly different from what went before.
The single most important development along these lines during this
century has been the almost universal adoption of deposit insurance
following the inception of both the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
in 1934. Before 1934 the individual depositor had always to regard his
deposit holdings as assets subject to default risk, and the wave of bank
failures during the early 1930s dramatically demonstrated the potential
impact of default not only on individuals' perceptions, and hence their
asset-holding behavior, but also on nonfinancial macroeconomic out-
comes. After 1934, depositors' losses due to bank failure shrank quickly
to miniscule proportion. Bank failures and forced mergers, of which
there were hundreds each year during the 1920s and more than 1,000
in each year during 1930-33 (over 4,000 in 1933 alone), suddenly
shrank to the double-digit range in 1934 and into single digits per year
by the end of World War II. Moreover, from 1934 until the mid-1970s
what few bank failures did occur were entirely concentrated among
banks with less than $100 million in deposits, and nearly three-fourths
of all failures were among banks with less than $1 million in deposits.
5
5
Even then, more often than not—and especially when a large bank has
failed, as in 1974—the FDIC arranged either for a merger or for the
assumption of the failed bank's valid assets (and a corresponding share
of its liabilities) by another bank, rather than simply pursuing liquida-
tion, so that depositors suffer no loss of liquidity at all. Even in cases
of liquidation, the FDIC has typically settled depositors' claims almost
immediately. In sum, the advent of deposit insurance has fundamentally
changed the nature of the American financial markets.
Federal regulation of banking has not been limited to that incidental
to the insurance of deposits. The Federal Reserve System, the FDIC,60 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/ A. W. Clausen
and the Comptroller of the Currency have shared with the individual
state banking commissions the responsibility for regulation and super-
vision of commercial banks. Important aspects of these activities include
inspecting bank operations (and in particular the composition of bank
portfolios), ruling on bank merger applications, and regulating the en-
trance of banks and bank-holding companies into activities beyond
traditional banking businesses. Because the fixed-percentage pricing sys-
tem for deposit insurance implicitly acts as a subsidy to risk-taking, it is
possible that the role of bank inspection has been especially important
in limiting the risk level of banking, although the available evidence is
ambiguous on this question.
3
6 Bank inspections have in any case become
more relevant for limiting risks as banks have moved heavily into inter-
national transactions such as exchange market trading and foreign lend-
ing. In addition, control over banks' applications to engage in nonbank-
ing activities has become more important as banks and their holding
companies have increasingly widened their scope to encompass leasing,
credit cards, real estate, insurance and other related activities.
Growth of federal regulation in the postwar era has also extended
beyond banks and other deposit intermediaries. The securities legisla-
tion of the 1930s, including especially the National Banking (Glass-
Steagall) and Securities Acts of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, not only created a separate securities industry distinct
from the commercial banking system but also set down an elaborate
set of rules governing securities issuing and trading and established the
Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce them. This legislation
of course antedated World War II, but many of its effects have appeared
only after the war. Disclosure requirements increased, and have con-
tinued to increase throughout the postwar years. Public utility companies
from 1941 and railroads from 1944 were compelled to seek competitive
bids on their new securities—a practice which over time brought major
changes in the structure of the investment banking industry.
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requirements for securities trading, set by the Federal Reserve under
authority of the 1933 act, have remained at or above 50 percent since
World War II—an especially sharp contrast to the experience of the
1920s. Under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, the regulation of
the postwar securities industry has extended also to asset management
as well as the trading and issuing functions. As of the time of writing,
the Securities and Exchange Commission is actively considering plans
to restructure securities trading so as to develop the nationwide market
system mandated by Congress in 1975, and it is possible that the imple-
mentation of such a system could eventually even result in a dealer
market replacing the auction market that has characterized most Amer-
ican stock exchanges for nearly two centuries.
Federal regulation of the financial markets has also affected non-
deposit intermediaries other than securities brokers and dealers. The61 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
most recent development along these lines, which bears potentially im-
portant implications not just for the financial markets but also for the
overall amount and composition of saving in the American economy,
is the regulation of private pension funds under the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974. In addition to the minimum pension
funding standards already discussed in section 1.3, this legislation fur-
ther specifies associated fiduciary responsibilities for the management of
pension funds' assets. Even within the first few years it has had a notice-
able impact on both the amount of pension funding and the composition
of pension investments. Given the already increasing role of private
pensions in postwar financial intermediation, as discussed above, these
changes are of great potential significance for the future.
1.4.2 New Distortions in the Allocative Mechanism
It would be surprising if the increase since World War II in the pres-
ence of government, both in the financial markets and more broadly in
the economy as a whole, had not brought with it at least some distor-
tions in the economy's allocative mechanism. In fact, as the postwar
period has advanced, government actions have directly or indirectly
introduced numerous distortions in the financial system's allocation of
capital. Several of these distortions, such as the restrictions on interna-
tional capital flows, have already figured in the discussion of sections
1.2 and 1.3. Nevertheless, it is important to note specifically two aspects
of the distortion of capital allocations that have been particularly im-
portant since World War II and have differentiated this period from the
prewar experience.
The National Banking Act of 1933 introduced deposit interest rate
ceilings, in part as a response to banks' alleged overly aggressive bid-
ding for interbank demand deposits during the 1920s. The ceilings have
also applied to other demand deposits as well as time and savings de-
posits, however, so that they have also served as an anticompetitive
device to subsidize bank profits and bank borrowers at the expense of
bank depositors. Given the postwar changes in the pattern of deposit
holding reviewed in section 1.3, the main focus of these ceilings, imposed
under the Federal Reserve's Regulation Q and analogous regulations
governing nonbank intermediaries, came to be consumer-type time and
savings deposits. Moreover, given the growing role of nonbank inter-
mediaries both in issuing such deposits and in mortgage lending, the
subsidy has mostly either passed to homeowners or bolstered the lending
institutions' (usually inaccessible) reserves.
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Apart from the long-run average subsidy transferred from depositors
to mortgage borrowers, however, the chief effect of deposit interest rate
ceilings has been the introduction of severe volatility into both interme-
diation and homebuilding through the interaction of these ceilings with
the cyclical pattern of short-term interest rate movements. A wholly new62 Benjamin M. Friedman/ Milton Friedman/ A. W. Clausen
postwar phenomenon, experienced for the first time when interest rates
on readily available open market investment instruments rose above the
prevailing savings deposit ceilings in 1966, was the widespread with-
drawal of deposits from both banks and nonbank deposit intermediaries.
This "disintermediation" then led to reduced mortgage lending, which
after some lag led in turn to a decline in residential construction activity.
As figure 1.7 shows, this pattern subsequently recurred in 1969-70 and
CERTIFICATE
- ACCOUNT CEILING































1963 1965 1970 1975 1978
Fig. 1.7 Disintermediation and residential construction.63 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
in 1973-74, with increasing severity except that in these more recent
episodes government sponsored intermediaries have increasingly supple-
mented the funds lost to the mortgage market. Nevertheless, the net
result has been the introduction of sufficient volatility into the residen-
tial construction industry to make the consequent decline in housing
activity a major element in postwar economic downturns.
The second major postwar distortion in the financial markets' capital-
allocation mechanism has come from taxes, and in particular from the
interaction of taxes with the more rapid price inflation of the later post-
war years. The federal government was constitutionally prohibited from
imposing income taxes until after passage of the Sixteenth Amendment
in 1913, and tax rates remained low by today's standards until World
War II. After the great increase instituted to finance the war, tax rates
have fallen only slowly during the postwar period. In addition, the effect
of inflation over time has been to lower the real income level associated
with the higher marginal tax rates.
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More importantly, however, because the income tax applies to nom-
inal asset returns—including gains in prices that merely keep pace with
inflation as well as whatever premium nominal interest rates include
to compensate lenders for the erosion in the real value of their principal
—the faster average rates of inflation in recent years have increasingly
magnified the associated tax distortions. Given the tax deductibility of
nominal interest payments, the after-inflation interest rate on long-term
borrowing by medium risk business corporations was negative during
ten of the thirteen years 1966-78. Analogously, for an individual in-
vestor in the median tax bracket among all American taxpayers, the
after-inflation after-tax return on Treasury bills was negative during nine
of these thirteen years. Moreover, the presence of deposit interest ceil-
ings has further compounded the effect of taxes and inflation. Not since
1967 have ordinary savings accounts at nonbank deposit institutions
returned a positive after-inflation after-tax yield to the investor in the
median tax bracket.
As noted in sections 1.2 and 1.3, a variety of tax-related effects have
influenced individuals' and businesses' asset-holding and liability-issuing
behavior as well as the structure of financial intermediation. Individuals'
and banks' preferences for tax-exempt state and local government secur-
ities, the postwar emphasis on debt in corporate finance, and the in-
creasing channeling of saving through pensions and other tax-exempt or
tax-sheltered vehicles are all attributable, at least in part, to the inter-
action of taxes and inflation. Within the later postwar years, these effects
have also led individuals to restructure their portfolios in yet further
ways, shifting from deposit to nondeposit forms of financial assets and,
even more, from financial assets to houses and other real investments.
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These and other similar distortions, such as those resulting from deposit
interest ceilings, have presumably had important effects not just on fi-
nancial market developments but on economic activity more generally.
1.4.3 The Growth of Government Intermediation
and Credit Guarantees
Another important change that has come about within the postwar
period, in part as a direct reaction to the distortions noted above, has
been the great increase in the federal government's activities as an inter-
mediary for, and also a guarantor of, private credit. The "off-budget"
sponsored credit agencies such as the Federal Home Loan Bank System
and the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank were in operation before
World War II, but the scale of their lending operations was small. As
of 1946 all of these agencies combined held only about $2 billion of
assets, the majority of which consisted of agricultural loans, and they
owed only $2 billion of liabilities. The focus of these agencies' activity
turned more toward support for homebuilding after the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association began its lending operations in 1955, but
as late as 1960, when their combined assets had reached $11 billion,
their total agricultural credit outstanding still exceeded their total hous-
ing credit. Only in the 1960s and 1970s, when the interaction of deposit
interest rate ceilings with rising nominal interest rates led to the intro-
duction of large-scale support for housing, did government financial
intermediation begin to increase rapidly.
Table 1.22 presents data, comparable to that given above for other
groups of intermediaries, for the assets of the federally sponsored credit
agencies and also the even more recent mortgage "pools" like the Gov-
ernment National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan
Corporation. Government sponsored intermediation has grown rapidly,
not just absolutely but in relation to gross national product, and by 1978
these intermediaries held more than one-fifth of all outstanding home
mortgages and nearly two-fifths of all outstanding farm debt. Moreover,
the total housing credit advanced by these intermediaries, which has
grown especially rapidly since the onset of periodic disintermediation
in the mid-1960s, includes not only direct purchases of mortgages but
also Federal Home Loan Bank advances to savings and loan associa-
tions, so that the effective amount is even greater. Given its pattern over
time, in the absence of this support even the cyclically of homebuilding
shown in figure 1.7 would presumably have been more severe. Federally
sponsored intermediaries accounted for 45 percent, 48 percent and 52
percent of the total net extensions of single-family home mortgage credit
in the high disintermediation years 1969, 1970, and 1974, respectively.
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Federally sponsored intermediaries conduct their business much like





































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Data are averages of year-end amounts, as percentages of annual gross
national product and as percentages of annual total assets. Detail may not add to
totals because of rounding.
purchase basis, and in turn issuing their own liabilities. There are at
least two important differences, however. One is that government inter-
mediaries do not operate subject to the profit motive alone. While they
pursue a profit objective, they do so within the limitations imposed by
their charter to support areas of economic activity designated by Con-
gress as public policy priorities.
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2 The other key difference is that the
liabilities of the mortgage pools and some of the sponsored credit agen-
cies are directly guaranteed by the federal government and accordingly
pay interest geared to that on federal government securities. Hence gov-
ernment intermediation also provides some degree of subsidy in the




The federal government's role as a credit guarantor is not limited to
the financial intermediation that it sponsors. Deposit insurance, for ex-
ample, constitutes the most prevalent form of government sponsored
guarantee provided for a fee. Other familiar government sponsored agen-
cies providing guarantees for a fee include the Veterans Administration,
the Federal Housing Authority, the Overseas Investors Protection Cor-66 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
poration, the Security Investors Protection Corporation, and most re-
cently the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. The federal govern-
ment has also sponsored large-scale guarantee programs for diverse
borrowers ranging from college students and small businesses to the
Lockheed and Chrysler Corporations and New York City. In all, the
government's 1978 outstanding credit and credit guarantees—including
direct loans, formally guaranteed loans, and other loans by federally
sponsored lenders—totaled $440 billion in comparison to $626 billion
of direct federal debt obligations outstanding. In addition, the amounts
of deposits insured by the FDIC and the Federal Savings and Loan In-
surance Corporation were $761 billion and $401 billion, respectively,
in 1978.
The postwar growth in the American economy's reliance on federal
government intermediation, deposit insurance, and other credit guaran-
tees has probably been to a great extent a counterpart of the govern-
ment's waning role as a direct borrower. Given the substantial decline
(relative to nonfinancial activity) that has occurred in the federal gov-
ernment's outstanding debt, and the corresponding increase in the out-
standing debt of private nonfinancial borrowers, the financial markets
have increasingly attempted to make private obligations more acceptable
to the economy's ultimate wealth holders by converting them into gov-
ernment obligations via government insurance and credit guarantees.
Along with the increase in private financial intermediation, the growth
of government credit guarantees broadly defined—including some that
are merely implicit—have enabled the American financial system to ab-
sorb the large postwar shift in the public versus private mix of direct
primary debt.
1.4.4 The Evolution of Monetary Policy
Finally, one of the most important, and importantly changing, aspects
of the federal government's role in the American financial markets dur-
ing the postwar era has been the monetary policy carried out by the
Federal Reserve System. The changes since World War II in the method
of conducting monetary policy, in the effect of monetary policy on the
American economy, and in the perceptions of monetary policy held by
financial market participants have all been profound.
Although monetary policy developments have been fundamental to
the interaction between the American financial markets and nonfinan-
cial economy, a detailed quantitative analysis of the macroeconomic
effects of postwar monetary policy lies beyond the scope of this essay.
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Nevertheless, an essay on postwar changes in the financial markets
would be incomplete without some attention—albeit at the qualitative
level—to how monetary policy has evolved over these years.67 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
The Federal Reserve System, created by Congress in 1914 as Amer-
ica's first central bank since the 1830s, has responsibility for maintaining
the currency and also for the implementation of monetary policy, which
along with fiscal policy has constituted one of the two principal engines
of government macroeconomic influence during much of this century.
As an historical matter, it is interesting to note that the macroeconomic
objectives universally associated with monetary policy in the postwar
era—and especially the objective of maintaining price stability—received
no mention by Congress in the original 1913 Federal Reserve Act. In-
stead, prompted by the recurrent series of financial crises and panics,
most recently in 1901, 1907, and 1913, Congress charged the new Fed-
eral Reserve System with the more direct task of preserving stability in
the financial markets. More specifically, with the contractionary eco-
nomic effect of the recent financial panics in mind, Congress instructed
the Federal Reserve "to furnish an elastic currency"—exactly the oppo-
site of the anti-inflation objective widely associated with monetary policy
and viewed by many people as the chief desideratum of monetary policy
today.
The use of monetary policy to achieve broader macroeconomic objec-
tives evolved slowly and cautiously during the prewar years, as econo-
mists and Federal Reserve officials gradually came to understand the
working of open market operations, now the most important tool of
monetary policy but not even contemplated as such in the Federal
Reserve Act. The establishment in 1923 of what subsequently developed
into today's Federal Open Market Committee led temporarily to an
increasing emphasis on open market operations and macroeconomic
objectives, but the confusions of the Depression and the associated
international monetary problems served to arrest the development of
the monetary policy mechanism. During World War II the Federal
Reserve facilitated the financing of the huge increase in public debt
noted above by supporting the prices of Treasury securities. After the
war the reluctance to impose losses on investors who had financed the
war effort led to a continuation of the bond price supports, thereby
precluding active use of monetary policy for a further half-decade.
The first major postwar change in the posture of American monetary
policy came in 1951, when the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord re-
lieved the central bank of its wartime obligation to peg long-term inter-
est rates. Monetary policy then assumed the macroeconomic role that it
has played ever since. Even so, interest rates, especially short-term
rates, remained relatively low during much of this period (see fig. 1.2),
and the Federal Reserve on balance followed the half-restrictive, half-
accommodative policy subsequently known as "leaning against the
wind." More specifically, the Federal Reserve primarily keyed its open68 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/ A. W. Clausen
market operations in the very short run to the net-free reserve position
(that is, excess reserves less borrowed reserves) of the commercial
banking system. The theory of open market operations underlying this
operating strategy—which was based on the relation between sources
and uses of bank reserves, and on the assumption of banks' interest-
inelastic demands for excess reserves and reluctance to borrow at the
discount window—implied that net-free reserves measured banks' will-
ingness to extend loans and create deposits, and hence measured the
effect of monetary policy in stimulating or retarding nonfinancial eco-
nomic activity. In addition, net-free reserves appeared to constitute the
perfect "money market" variable—a close proxy for market interest
rates (given the level of the Federal Reserve's own discount rate), yet
not itself an interest rate and hence not a contradiction of the accord.
For several reasons financial market participants during the 1950s
and even the early 1960s did not attach to monetary policy the great
importance that they have associated with it in more recent years. The
"go-slow" consensus economic philosophy of the Eisenhower years—
which Congress never actively opposed, even under the Democratic
majorities of the second half of the decade—was broadly consistent
with the "sound money" ethos traditionally associated with central bank-
ing as well as the more specific "leaning against the wind" policy, which
served to dampen cyclical fluctuations of market interest rates as well
as to keep them low on average. In addition, although most economists
had favored the accord freeing monetary policy, much of the popular
thinking of the 1950s emphasized the newfound importance of fiscal
policy.
Several changes occurred thereafter, however, that not only height-
ened market participants' awareness of monetary policy but also changed
how monetary policy worked. The emergence of a "guns plus butter"
policy, as the Great Society program and the Vietnam War effort peaked
simultaneously, had the support of Congress but appeared to be running
afoul of the Federal Reserve as interest rates climbed steadily beginning
in 1965. Restrictive monetary policy was a major factor, and visibly so,
in the macroeconomic policy environment from 1966 on, in part because
of the increased sensitivity of the financial markets to interest rate levels
as they interacted with the deposit rate ceilings (see fig. 1.7). After
1969 the acceleration of price inflation raised new questions about the
relative priority of full employment and price stability in macroeconomic
policy making, and the business recessions of 1969-70 and especially
1973-75 placed monetary policy in the middle between the unprece-
dented double-digit price inflation and the highest unemployment rate
of the postwar era. Monetary policy had gradually moved from off stage
to on, and then to the center.69 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
Another source of the increasing attention focused on monetary pol-
icy during the second half of the postwar period has been a change of
attitudes toward fiscal policy. When it emerged during the 1960s that
an occasionally flexible fiscal policy was not as sufficient as many people
had hoped as a "cure" for business fluctuations, the perception of the
potential of monetary policy expanded to fill the apparent need. As is
usual in such situations, once opinion began to change it probably went
too far in the opposite direction. In the context of an already somewhat
polarized economic policy environment, monetary policy therefore be-
came simultaneously the hope of those who opposed whatever they
believed to be the current stance of fiscal policy, as well as the target of
those who supported that stance but were dissatisfied with the apparent
results. Moreover, the question of the fiscal-monetary balance, and there-
fore the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies, also emerged as
issues of some import. Matters of timing came to be perceived as rele-
vant too, as evidence accumulated on the lags associated with the effects
of policy actions. Most economists continued to believe that the "out-
side" lags with which monetary policy influences business activity were
longer than the corresponding fiscal policy lags, but the Federal Re-
serve's compact decision structure shortened the "inside" lag of mone-
tary policy in comparison with the cumbersome Congressional committee
process involved in taking fiscal actions.
At the same time, questions arose about the operating methods used
to conduct monetary policy per se. Most of the attention centered on
the short-run policy of setting the banking system's free reserve position,
and then after 1961 on the corresponding short-run policy of setting a
short-term interest rate. The essence of the debate was whether this
operating method in fact constituted only a short-run guide for open
market operations aimed at broader objectives or, instead, had devel-
oped into a system of false beacons for policy over the longer run. The
main point was that it was not appropriate simply to regard monetary
policy as steady or changing because market interest rates (or free re-
serves) were fixed or moving. What mattered was instead the relation-
ship between observed interest rates and something else—something
that was at best difficult to determine. Events played a part here, too,
as the acceleration and increasing volatility of price inflation rendered
the inference of a "real" market rate of interest ever more difficult. To
the extent that allowing for price expectations was basic to interpreting
observed (nominal) interest rates as "indicators" of the likely effect of
monetary policy on nonfinancial economic activity, calculating such cor-
rections was becoming ever more difficult.
At the beginning of the 1970s, therefore, the Federal Reserve shifted
the strategy of its monetary policy yet again—this time to an emphasis70 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
on quantitative measures of commercial banking activity in general and
on the narrowly defined Ml money stock in particular. In the late 1960s
the Federal Reserve had experimented with a "proviso" approach, ac-
cording to which short-run open market operations pursued a stated
interest rate objective provided that doing so did not cause some aggre-
gate measure to deviate from a predetermined range. In 1970 the Fed-
eral Reserve finally adopted an operating strategy based explicitly on
monetary targets. The directives governing the conduct of open market
operations continued to specify a narrowly constrained short-term inter-
est rate (the federal funds rate), but with the clear understanding that
this practice was in large part meant to achieve the targeted rate of
monetary growth. Although these directives typically specified target
ranges for the growth of several monetary aggregates, as well as com-
mercial bank credit, in practice the focus of policy through the time of
writing seems to have been primarily on the narrow money stock.
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The Federal Reserve's monetary-targets strategy has subsequently
evolved into a fairly well-defined two-stage procedure. First, at the
"strategy" level, about once per quarter the Federal Reserve translates
its ultimate policy aims (in terms of the economy's growth, employment,
price stability, and so on) into a set of desired growth rates for the
monetary aggregates over the next year. Because it will choose a new
set of desired one-year growth rates three months later, however, only
the first quarter of this one-year extrapolation is of direct operational
relevance. Second, at the "tactics" level, within the quarter the Federal
Reserve determines how best to manipulate the instruments over which
it can exert close control (such as nonborrowed bank reserves, or a
short-term interest rate) so as to cause the designated monetary aggre-
gates to move in the specified way. In practice the federal funds rate
typically served in this instrument role until 1979, when the Federal
Reserve initiated a new experiment using the growth of bank reserves
as its short-run operating guide. Although the Federal Open Market
Committee, which has responsibility for these decisions, meets formally
only once a month, it also occasionally uses telephone conferences to
make within-month adjustments in the instrument setting aimed at
achieving the desired monetary growth, subject only to the need to
avoid undue instability in the money market. Apart from occasional
variations, the Federal Reserve has essentially continued to pursue its
monetary-targets operating strategy along these lines through the time
of writing.
In part as a result of the new strategy of open market operations
implemented during the 1970s, the short-run volatility of market interest
rates sharply increased (see fig. 1.2). These wider interest rate fluctua-
tions in turn have been the source of many of the developments dis-
cussed earlier in this essay. Together with the ever higher average level71 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
of interest rates during the second half of the postwar period, they have
heightened the awareness of monetary policy among nearly all partici-
pants in the financial markets. In addition, along with dissatisfaction
with macroeconomic outcomes in the 1970s, they have spurred Congress
to institute regular "oversight" procedures requiring the Federal Reserve
periodically to report its current monetary growth targets through the
relevant Congressional committees. The practical ability of Congress to
supervise the Federal Reserve's monetary policy in any effective sense,
however, appears to be dubious at best.
6
6
Finally, a feature of American monetary policy that has also changed
several times since World War II has been the degree of influence asso-
ciated with international considerations. Before the war international
financial matters were often at the heart of Federal Reserve policy
making. By contrast, during the "dollar shortage" of the early postwar
years American monetary policy was largely free to pursue domestic
objectives without much regard for international considerations, and the
relatively conservative posture of monetary policy (and fiscal policy)
during much of the 1950s posed no threat to the country's already strong
currency anyway.
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7 After the balance of payments had become a major
problem in the early 1960s, however, the Federal Reserve began at
times to take monetary policy decisions with an eye to their interna-
tional ramifications. Since then the international constraint on monetary
policy making has strengthened and then waned several times. Somewhat
surprisingly, although the American role in the international monetary
system became a major focus of attention in the early 1970s, with the
exchange rate realignment and suspension of dollar-gold convertibility
in 1971 and the move to floating exchange rates after 1973, American
monetary policy primarily emphasized domestic objectives during these
years. By contrast, in the late 1970s (and through the time of writing),
despite inconvertibility and floating rates international considerations
appear to have exerted more influence over monetary policy than at any
time since the early 1960s.
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1.5 Summary and Concluding Comments
This essay has documented three major developments that have dom-
inated the American financial markets since World War II.
First, the nonfinancial economy has increasingly relied on private
debt financing. At the war's end there was much government debt but
little private debt outstanding. Since then both nonfinancial businesses
and individuals have greatly increased their indebtedness, while the
federal government has sharply reduced its indebtedness, in comparison
to the economy's nonfinancial activity. The sustained rise in private in-
debtedness has represented in part a return to prewar practices after72 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/A. W. Clausen
the aberration of the depression and war years and in part the establish-
ment of new norms for indebtedness in relation to incomes. Perceptions
of enhanced economic prosperity and stability, greater tax incentives to
debt finance under conditions of accelerating price inflation and rising
nominal interest rates, increased holdings of physical assets, and the
relative decline in government-issued debt per se have probably played
some part in accounting for the large relative increase in the nonfinancial
economy's private debt.
Second, the economy has increasingly relied on financial intermedi-
aries to hold the claims issued by nonfinancial borrowers. Individuals
as well as other nonfinancial investors have allocated a growing share
of their portfolios to claims on financial intermediaries, rather than di-
rect claims on nonfinancial borrowers. Even in the holding of corporate
equities, the one area traditionally dominated by individual ownership,
intermediaries have begun to play a more substantial role. Nonbank
deposit intermediaries, including especially savings and loan associations,
and private and public sector pension funds have figured prominently
in the continuing overall postwar rise in financial intermediation. This
increasing degree of financial intermediation has facilitated the increased
debt financing of private nonfinancial borrowers and, together with a
series of financial innovations, has also helped to break down barriers
and frictions interfering with efficient allocation of the economy's finan-
cial resources.
Third, in contrast to its declining role as a direct borrower, the federal
government has in other ways become more of an influence in the finan-
cial markets. The government has increasingly served as an insurer and
guarantor of, and an intermediary for, private claims. Federal deposit
insurance, instituted shortly before the war, importantly changed the
character of private intermediation, and other forms of government credit
guarantees have proliferated subsequently. Federally sponsored credit
agencies, and more recently mortgage pools, have supplemented private
intermediation. Government regulation of the financial markets has also
increased in both scope and effect, and market participants have come
to attach ever more importance to monetary policy actions as well.
Finally, it is important to reemphasize that these three postwar devel-
opments—the rise of the private debt economy, the increasing degree of
financial intermediation, and the growing role of the federal government
—are not independent phenomena. These three ongoing processes con-
stitute different but closely related facets of the same overall pattern of
American financial evolution. Because of the differing risk and liquidity
characteristics of public versus private securities, the postwar shift from
public to private debt has increased the economy's need for financial
intermediation, and the growth and development of that intermediation
have in turn facilitated the successful issuance and absorption of ever73 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
greater amounts of private debt relative to nonfinancial activity. Simi-
larly, in place of direct government-issued debt, the federal government
has indirectly transformed private debt into its own on an increasing
scale through a combination of guarantees and federally sponsored inter-
mediation. On balance, over thirty-five years the most important post-
war changes in the American financial markets have largely been parts
of the same consistent story.
Notes
1. See Gordon's essay in this volume (chap. 2) for a comprehensive treatment.
2. Moreover, the use of annual data for the first seven downturns shown in
table 1.2 importantly understates the peak-to-trough decline of real gross national
product in comparison to that shown using quarterly data for the six postwar
downturns.
3. Kindleberger (1978) provides a lively review of the international propaga-
tion of economic disturbances.
4. Perry (1977), Jorgenson (1978), and Perloff and Wachter (1979) docu-
mented this shift and offered alternative explanations.
5. Debt issued by nonfinancial borrowers is similar to the concept of "primary
securities" introduced by Gurley and Shaw (1960).
6. The data shown here include only those liabilities classified as "credit market
debt" in the Federal Reserve Board's flow-of-funds accounts. The debt of the fed-
eral government therefore excludes currency and bank reserves but includes the
Federal Reserve System's holding of United States government securities ($147.8
billion and $118.6 billion, respectively, as of year-end 1978). For state and local
governments, households, and unincorporated nonfinancial businesses, credit mar-
ket debt in each case constituted 95 percent or more of all liabilities outstanding
as of year-end 1978; for nonfinancial business corporations, year-end 1978 total
liabilities consisted of 71 percent credit market liabilities, 24 percent trade debt
(almost all owed to each other), and 5 percent other liabilities.
7. It is not appropriate to include foreign debt in an analysis of these data from
the perspective of the United States economy's liability-issuing behavior. By con-
trast, if there were some assurance that debt issued by foreign borrowers in United
States markets remained in the portfolios of United States investors, then it would
be appropriate to include that debt in an analysis from the perspective of the
United States economy's asset-holding behavior. (The caveat, of course, would
apply as well to debt issued in the United States markets by United States bor-
rowers. )
8. The peak debt/GNP ratio during 1918-78 occurred in 1933, the trough year
of the Depression. In addition, much of the household and business debt nominally
outstanding during the Depression was of questionable actual value.
9. During 1953-78 the United States debt/GNP ratio has been more stable than
the money/GNP ratio. This statement is true regardless of whether one uses an-
nual or quarterly data, either unadjusted or detrended, with money measured as
either Ml or M2; see B. Friedman (1979).
10. See B. Friedman (1979) for a discussion of each of these three behavioral
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11. The United States government's debt increased from only $1.2 billion in
1916, the year before the United States entered the war, to $25.6 billion in 1919,
the year after the war ended.
12. Apart from a discrepancy due to inadequacies of statistical reporting, the
total sources of funds shown in table 1.5 is equal to the total uses of funds shown
in table 1.4.
13. Apart from a discrepancy due to inadequacies of statistical reporting, the
total sources of funds shown in table 1.5 is equal to the total uses of funds shown
in table 1.4.
13. According to U.S. Department of Commerce estimates, reported deprecia-
tion allowances understated corporations' true capital consumption by some $2-4
billion annually during 1946-61, then overstated it by about the same amount
during 1962-73, and since 1974 has understated it again by an increasing amount
($13 billion in 1978). See Feldstein and Summers (1979) for an analysis of the
relation between allowable depreciation and true capital consumption under con-
ditions of price inflation.
14. During 1971-76, the years of the equity bulge, public utility companies
accounted for 46 percent of total gross offerings, and preferred shares accounted
for 29 percent of total gross offerings. (These data, from the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, are not available on the net basis used in table 1.5.)
15. For an analysis of this issue see Feldstein (1976) and Feldstein et al.
(1978). The more basic point that the corporate tax structure favors debt over
equity financing has long been familiar; see, for example, Modigliani and Miller
(1963).
16. The rise in short-term indebtedness (which reached 25.7 percent of credit
market debt as of year-end 1978) still seems small in comparison with the atten-
tion it has received. Moreover, even the small increase that has occurred may be
only an illusion if, as seems likely, an increasing share of bank lending is actually
intermediate term. The much discussed notion of declining corporate liquidity is
captured much better by the relationships among both liabilities and assets. (See
data in table 1.4 on funds used to acquire financial assets.) The year-end ratio of
the corporate sector's liquid assets to its short-term liabilities has fallen from .86'
in 1946 to .68 in 1950, .48 in 1960, .26 in 1970 and a low point of .25 in 1973;
after recovering to .34 in 1976, as a consequence of the severe 1973-75 recession,
the ratio has fallen again to .27 in 1978.
17. Hendershott and Hu (1979) have documented the growing after-tax incen-
tive for individuals' mortgage borrowing to finance home ownership in recent
years, even for those in marginal tax brackets as low as 30 percent. A similar
conclusion holds for consumer credit, although here low tax bracket individuals
account for more of the borrowing.
18. Apart from a discrepancy due to inadequacies of statistical reporting, the
total sources of funds shown in table 1.8 is equal to the total "investment" uses of
funds shown in table 1.7.
19. Although installment credit constituted only about one-half of total con-
sumer credit outstanding in the early postwar years, it has so dominated consumer
borrowing that, as of year-end 1978, households owed $276 billion of installment
credit and only $64 billion of other consumer credit.
20. Since the early 1960s the most rapidly growing expense item of state and
local governments has been contributions to their employees' pension funds; see
Munnell and Connolly (1976) for a review of this experience. The growth of these
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21. To avoid confusion it is worth noting explicitly that the general funds of
state and local governments were in surplus in the 1970s. Since their pension
funds also run a large current surplus, the state-local government sector has been
heavily in surplus on a consolidated basis throughout the postwar period.
22. Because of the enormous size of the United States markets, however, espe-
cially in comparison with specific foreign markets, what represents only a small
part of lending here may often play a sizable role in meeting the needs of particu-
lar foreign borrowers.
23. See Solomon (1977) for a description of the capital controls program and
a discussion placing it in the context of the United States economy's postwar for-
eign economic policy.
24. Remaining barriers to foreign securities issues in the United States market
include the withholding tax on interest and dividends paid to foreigners and dis-
closure requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
25. Because of the cyclicality of transfer payments and the overall weakness of
the United States economy in the 1970s, the data shown in table 1.11 slightly
overstate the trend increase in both transfers and total federal expenditures in
relation to gross national product. See Break's essay in this volume (chap. 9) for
a comprehensive review of postwar trends in federal spending.
26. In 1978, the fourth year of the economic expansion, the (calendar year)
federal deficit was $28 billion, or 1.3 percent of gross national product.
27. During this same period the Federal Reserve System was trying, via its
"Operation Twist," to shorten the mean maturity of the federal debt held by
public investors. As table 1.12 shows, the debt management policy predominated.
A number of researchers subsequently attempted to analyze the effects of Opera-
tion Twist as if it were not offset by debt management policy; see, for example,
Modigliani and Sutch (1966; 1967). In light of the prevailing debt management
policy, it is not surprising that such efforts were unsuccessful.
28. See Goldsmith (1958; 1969) and Gurley and Shaw (1960) for an analysis
of the prewar experience.
29. The interesting question of cause and effect between these two developments
lies beyond the scope of this essay.
30. The data plotted in figure 1.4 and used also in table 1.13 refer only to finan-
cial assets and hence exclude nonfinancial assets like houses and consumer du-
rables. As of year-end 1978 households' nonfinancial assets, valued at replacement
cost, totaled $2.8 trillion (of which $1.5 trillion was residential real estate) in
comparison to $4.8 trillion of financial assets. The available current-value data on
nonfinancial asset holdings are understandably weak.
31. Moreover, these data overstate households' direct equity holdings in that
they do not separate holdings via mutual funds, which grew from an average 2
percent of total equity holdings in 1946-50 to 7 percent in 1971-75.
32. Feldstein (1974), for example, derived a large estimate of social security
"wealth" (defined as the present discounted value of expected future benefits)
and found evidence of a significant impact of social security on private saving
behavior. Although this work and the literature that has followed it have empha-
sized effects on total saving behavior, there is no reason to expect the composition
of asset holding to remain invariant.
33. Some of the best-known examples of this thinking were Greenough (1951)
and Advisory Committee (1969).
34. Lintner (1975), Modigliani and Cohn (1979), and Feldstein (1979), among
others, have provided analyses of the failure of equity returns to keep pace with
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35. Table 1.14 is adapted from Bodie (1979) and is based on updated annual
data compiled by Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1977); see also Bodie (1976). See
Cagan (1974) for a more detailed examination of data over a longer time period
and for cross-country comparisons.
36. See Hartman (1978) for a review of the participation of foreign investors
in the United States financial markets. A distinction documented by Hartman is
that, within the category of long-term portfolio (as opposed to direct) investments,
foreign investors have mostly bought United States equities while United States
investors have mostly bought foreign debt securities.
37. Funds generated internally and retained by corporate businesses also repre-
sent a form of investment by the holders of equity shares in those corporations.
Given the large household ownership of equities, including retained earnings in
the data shown in table 1.12 would greatly increase the share of funds "advanced"
by nonfinancial investors, but it would still leave intermediaries as the direct
source of well over half of the total.
38. Much of this literature has followed the lead of Gurley and Shaw (1960).
39. Following Glass-Steagall, commercial banks no longer engage in investment
banking or broker-dealer activities for publicly offered corporate securities, al-
though they do so for public sector securities, and in recent years they have been
increasingly involved in arranging direct placements of corporate securities. In
addition, the trust departments of commercial banks continue to be the largest
single factor in private asset management.
40. See Fellner and Larkins (1976) for a discussion of the stability of M2
velocity, and B. Friedman (1980) for a corresponding discussion for bank credit.
41. The work of M. Friedman (1959) and M. Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
explained the downward prewar trend in M2 velocity by emphasizing the role of
money as a luxury good.
42. Banks' holdings of Treasury securities were essentially flat from 1946 until
the swelling of the federal deficit occurred in 1975, so that banks' portfolios of
municipals have exceeded their portfolios of Treasuries ever since 1969. Except
for 1974-76, all of the growth in banks' holdings of federal government debt has
consisted of federal agency securities.
43. See Goldfeld (1973; 1976) for a review of the postwar evidence on money
demand behavior.
44. See Rhoades (1976) for a summary of changes in banking structure follow-
ing the 1970 amendments.
45. In table 1.18, however, the respective size of the three groups is indicated
by their total assets because of the lack of historical data on pension funds' lia-
bilities.
46. See Weiss (1976) for a review of the ERISA legislation and its impact.
47. Tepper and Affleck (1974) and Oldfield (1976), among others, have inves-
tigated the nature of this underfunding. Although corporations are now required
to report (as a footnote to the balance sheet) the difference between pension
assets and liabilities for vested benefits, there is no easy way to discover the liabil-
ity for no/ivested benefits.
48. See again Munnell and Connolly (1976).
49. Silber (1977), for example, has analyzed liquidity provided by markets as
an alternative to liquidity provided by intermediaries.
50. See Branson's essay in this volume (chap. 3) for a comprehensive treatment.
51. Silber (1975) has developed a theory of financial innovation. For discus-
sions of the impact of specific recent financial innovations, see, for example, Lie-
berman (1977), Porter et al. (1979), and Lombra and Kaufman (1978).77 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
52. Tobin (1963), for example, called on the government to issue such an in-
strument long before the major acceleration of inflation. More recently, researchers
have sought to discover why the private markets have not provided it; see, for
example, Fischer (1975; 1979).
53. See, for example, Modigliani and Lessard (1975).
54. See Caves' essay in this volume (chap. 7) for a comprehensive treatment.
55. Data on bank failures are available from M. Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
and successive issues of the FDIC Annual Report.
56. For analyses of this issue see, for example, Maisel (1980).
57. The federal government's most ambitious postwar effort to restructure the
investment banking industry failed, however, when the government lost the anti-
trust suit it brought against seventeen leading investment banking firms (United
States v. Morgan et al.) in 1951.
58. An anomaly of these ceilings is that mutual institutions which are in prin-
ciple owned by their depositors—including savings and loan associations, mutual
savings banks, and credit unions—are prohibited from fully distributing earnings
to their owners. Earnings above the ceiling rate merely accumulate unless the in-
stitution converts to a stock organization (as is legal for savings and loans), in
which case they become a windfall to the new owners.
59. Congress has repeatedly adjusted the brackets, but on balance these adjust-
ments have had sufficient redistributive elements to reduce the real income level
to which the higher marginal rates apply.
60. Kane (1980), for example, has documented the substantial shifts in indi-
viduals' asset holding since the early 1960s.
61. It is possible, however, that the mortgage market receives less as a net
addition to available funds than all of the credit provided by the sponsored credit
agencies and mortgage pools if they in turn sell their securities to investors who
would otherwise have held deposits in thrift institutions. See, for example, the
analysis of this question in Jaffee and Rosen (1979).
62. It is important not to draw this distinction too firmly, however. For exam-
ple, savings and loan associations are constrained to hold at least 82 percent of
their asset portfolios in residential mortgages (or other qualified assets). Also, as
the discussion above notes, in the presence of deposit interest ceilings limiting the
pay-out of earnings to holders of deposit shares, it is not clear what role the profit
motive plays in savings and loans' portfolio decisions.
63. See Penner and Silber (1973) for an analysis of the subsidy implicit in
federal credit programs.
64. See Gordon's essay in this volume (chap. 2). For more detailed accounts
of postwar monetary policy, see M. Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Brunner and
Meltzer (1964), Guttentag (1966), Bach (1971), Brimmer (1972), and Poole
(1975). Parts of what follows draw on B. Friedman (1977; 1978).
65. Although some observers have alleged that the Federal Reserve's commit-
ment to the monetary growth targets has been largely rhetorical, a steady accumu-
lation of evidence shows that the observed movement of the money stock in
relation to its targeted growth path has become a major determinant—on some
evidence, the dominant one—of short-run monetary policy operations. De Rosa
and Stern (1977), Feige and McGhee (1979), and Lombra and Moran (1979)
have all found evidence to this effect.
66. Pierce (1978) and Roberts (1978) have both assessed this effort and drawn
essentially negative conclusions.
67. Concerns about the dollar's external position first arose in conjunction with
the government's $12 billion deficit in 1958—a peacetime record at the time, and78 Benjamin M. Friedman/Milton Friedman/ A. W. Clausen
equal to nearly 3 percent of the gross national product (a relative size not again
reached until the 1973-75 recession).
68. See again Solomon (1977) for a detailed account of the role of interna-
tional factors in United States monetary policy making.
2. Milton Friedman
The Changing Character of Financial Markets
World War II may be a meaningful watershed for many aspects of
American economic development—though I have my doubts. But two
other dates are far more significant for analyzing changes in financial
institutions and their role in the economy: first 1933, the end of the
Great Contraction and the beginning of a major structural reform of
financial institutions; second, the mid-1960s, the beginning of wide-
spread recognition that the immediate problem was not deflationary
collapse but rather inflation.
The institutional changes that followed the Great Contraction were
designed to reduce the susceptibility of the financial system to collapse;
and largely succeeded in doing so. But those very changes made the
system ill adapted to cope with inflation. When that danger emerged,
further changes in the financial structure occurred that are still far from
complete. They too may well be completed after the major need for
them has passed.
Post-1933 Changes
My task with respect to the post-1933 changes is eased by a broad-
brush evaluation that I made of some of these changes a quarter of a
century ago—in chronological time; it seems much longer in psycho-
logical time, to borrow Maurice Allais's perceptive distinction.
With respect to changes in the United States banking structure, I
wrote:
Three major changes have occurred in this system since the great
depression: first, the establishment in 1934 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation; second, a growth in the importance of gov-
ernment obligations among bank assets; third, a loosening of the links
between gold and domestic monetary conditions. These changes have
transformed the banking system to an extent that is not generally
recognized. . . .
The combined effect of ... [these changes] is to eliminate as a
Milton Friedman is Senior Research Fellow of the Hoover Institution and Paul
Snowden Russell Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University
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practical possibility anything approaching a collapse of the American
banking structure. Insurance rules out an internal drain or banking
panic; the importance of government obligations reduces the sensi-
tivity of the stock of money to internal private credit changes; the
dethroning of gold reduces its sensitivity to changes in external condi-
tions. It is hard to see how under these circumstances any sharp
decline in the stock of money could occur except through deliberate
action by the monetary authorities to bring one about. This is very
different from the situation prior to 1933, when it would have re-
quired deliberate action by the monetary authorities to prevent a
decline in the stock of money. I hasten to add that none of these
changes rules out sharp increases in the stock of money. . . .
After commenting on changes in the fiscal structure and in the psycho-
logical climate of opinion, I concluded:
Our present monetary and fiscal institutions are so constructed that
anything more than a minor economic recession is extremely unlikely,
even if, or especially if, no explicit action is taken by Congress or the
Administration. But unless the recession is exceedingly minor, explicit
action will be taken. The widespread general fear of depression would
lead Congress to force such action on any administration whatever
its political complexion. . . . Such additional action will be unneces-
sary. Even more, it will be positively harmful. . . . Measures taken to
stem a supposed depression will serve to stimulate the succeeding
recovery and to convert it into another round of inflation.
This inflation will not get out of hand; the same built-in stabilizers
that would prevent a depression from getting out of hand will also
prevent a runaway inflation. Sooner or later another recession will
come along. . . . When it does, the same process is likely to be re-
peated.
The prospect is therefore a period of recurrent bouts of inflation
produced by overreaction to the temporary recessions that punctuate
the period. How long will this period last? How serious will the infla-
tion be? . . . These questions seem to me to admit of no easy answer.
Much depends on accidents of timing and politics, both internal and
external.
Economists have known—at least intermittently—for over a cen-
tury and a half two propositions: first, that by printing enough money
you can produce any desired degree of activity; second, that the ulti-
mate result is destruction of the currency. The American public has
learned the first proposition. It once knew, but has now forgotten,
the second. Only experience is likely to teach it once again.
1
Experience has been teaching it—and that is the major source of the
developments discussed in the next section.
The second change in the banking structure—the increased ratio of
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temporary in form, though long lasting in substance. As Benjamin Fried-
man notes in his background paper, the ratio of government obligations
to total commercial bank assets has returned to its earlier level, thanks
to the reduction, primarily via inflation, in the explicit government debt
as a fraction of income. However, the main thrust of the first two
changes—assumption by government of responsibility for the security
in nominal terms of nominal private assets—has continued. Guarantees
have been expanded from deposits in commercial banks and thrift insti-
tutions to Federal Housing Administration and veterans' housing loans,
Federal National Mortgage Association, Government National Mort-
gage Association, Federal Land Bank, and Federal Home Loan obliga-
tions in the housing area; loans to small businesses and students; secur-
ities of New York City; loans to Lockheed and Chrysler. And no doubt
this is a highly partial list.
Benjamin Friedman gives an estimate in his background paper of the
total amount of some of the outstanding liabilities currently issued or
guaranteed by the Federal government. They total nearly three times as
much as all direct Treasury obligations. The grand total must by now
equal well over half of the total financial assets of the public, and an
even larger fraction if the present value of the public's claims to future
benefits from social security and from government pensions is included
as an asset of the public and a liability of the government.
A corollary is that the decline in the ratio of the funded government
debt to national income is highly misleading. Total direct, contingent,
and unfunded government debt has almost surely been rising in recent
years rather than falling as a fraction of national income. How else ex-
plain the decline in the yield differential between corporate Aaa bonds
and long-term Treasury bonds?
All of this has to do with nominal liabilities and assets. The real value
of the physical assets corresponding to nominal liabilities remains sub-
ject to all the dynamic forces in a dynamic economy. The guarantee of
nominal assets has been accompanied by fluctuations in their real value
through variable inflation. Uncertainty has been rechanneled, papered
over by a facade of misleading dollar figures.
Federal insurance of bank deposits was accompanied by the adoption
of Regulation Q, which prohibited the payment of interest on demand
deposits and authorized ceilings on rates of interest that could be paid
by depository institutions on other categories of deposits. Regulation Q
proved to be a concealed time bomb that had its greatest effect during
our second period after interest rates started to respond to inflation. The
interest rate limits were largely innocuous for a long time after they
were imposed. They were above market rates and so neither performed
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Similarly, the third change, the reduced role of gold, was finally con-
summated during our second period, in 1971, though it had considerable
impact earlier.
Two developments after 1933 deserve mention to put the changes in
the banking structure in perspective.
First, the changes in banking structure were accompanied by a shift
in power: from the regional Federal Reserve Banks to the Board in
Washington and from the Federal Reserve System to the Treasury De-
partment. The Fed became a largely passive adjunct to the Treasury,
playing no active part until the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord in
1951, and, paradoxically, gaining importance through the 1960s as it
became a more potent engine of inflation.
The shift of power from monetary to fiscal authorities coincided with
a matching shift in economic thinking. The initial shift in power owed
nothing to the Keynesian revolution. However, it was strongly reinforced
by the changing climate of academic opinion. Research in the Federal
Reserve System itself on monetary matters proper largely came to a
halt. It was replaced with research on Keynesian lines, which culminated
years later in Federal Reserve collaboration in developing a large-scale
econometric model in which monetary forces played at most a bit part,
entering only via a narrow range of interest rates.
Second, the commercial banking system itself lost power and place
to other institutions. The reforms of the 1930s which limited the func-
tions that banks could perform laid the basis for growth in other finan-
cial intermediaries and were later strongly reinforced by the impact of
Regulation Q. The stress of competition subsequently forced innovation
that slowed the decline of commercial banks and altered their operations
in the ways that Benjamin Friedman discusses.
A final comment is relevant to the ending of the initial phase and the
beginning of the second. The inflationary roller coaster that I predicted
in my 1954 talk did not arrive on schedule in the United States (though
it did in the United Kingdom). It started in the 1950s but was then
aborted by the successive recessions of 1957-58 and 1960, so that, by
1960, inflation was close to zero. Only then did the roller coaster really
take off.
That interruption reflected, 1 conjecture, the accident of a nonpo-
litical president, Dwight Eisenhower, who was willing to sacrifice his
party's, and his vice-president's, presidential prospects in order to cut
short the inflationary process. He succeeded, bequeathing to his succes-
sor, John F. Kennedy, a noninflationary environment. The process of
"recurrent bouts of inflation produced by overreactions to ... temporary
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That is why it was not until the mid-1960s that inflationary expecta-
tions began to become part of the standard outlook of consumers,
businessmen, and participants in the financial markets. It has always
seemed remarkable to me how late this development occurred and how
slowly it proceeded. Even now, after more than two decades, many
phenomena in the financial world—particularly, persistent negative real
rates of interest—are hard to rationalize except on the assumption that
many participants anticipate a fairly prompt return to a noninflationary
environment.
Post-1960s
No single year marks the beginning of the inflationary period as
sharply as 1933 marks the end of the contraction. Robert Gordon, in
his perceptive background paper, picks 1967 and that is probably as
good a single date as any. It comes after the beginning of the actual
inflationary roller coaster—that is clearly 1960. It comes before wide-
spread recognition that a "new era" was under way. However, it is a
good date to mark the beginning of the successive changes in the finan-
cial structure that the new era was to bring. That unattractive word
"disintermediation" entered the financial vocabulary in 1966, revealing
clearly how perverse in a time of inflation were the effects on the finan-
cial structure of reforms designed to reduce the evils of deflation.
The rapid rise in the velocity of Ml as depositors found ways to
economize on non-interest-bearing demand deposits showed that regu-
lation Q was beginning to bite. Similarly, many of the financial changes
over the next decade that are referred to by Benjamin Friedman reflected
the attempt to evade or avoid Q with respect to both demand and time
deposits: negotiable certificates of deposits, negotiable orders of with-
drawal (NOW) accounts, automatically transferable savings accounts,
special certificates of deposit available to depositors at mutual savings
banks and savings and loan associations, money market mutual funds,
and so on. Benjamin Friedman emphasizes the extent to which these
and other financial innovations contributed to market efficiency. My
own reaction is quite different: what a waste of capital and human in-
genuity simply to get around restrictions and regulations that should
never have been imposed, that were never justified by the ostensible
purpose of reducing the vulnerability of the financial system to defla-
tionary pressure and were adopted only because the circumstances en-
abled commercial banks and other financial institutions to persuade
Congress to grant them special privileges they had long sought. In the
1960s and thereafter, the banks were hoisted on their own petard.
Did we really need still another demonstration of how ingenious eco-
nomic actors are in getting around government restrictions that interfere
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efficiency to replace or supplement commercial banks in their function
of mediating transactions by savings and loan institutions, mutual sav-
ings banks, credit unions, money market funds, Sears-Roebuck, and the
telephone company? Or to create a situation in which persons with small
sums to invest are struck with rates of return half as large as those
available to persons with large sums?
The explosive growth of the Eurodollar market is another example
of the same phenomenon. The Eurodollar market was initially estab-
lished largely as a way to hold dollars not subject to freezing by United
States authorities. But its growth was greatly stimulated by regulation Q
which could be avoided by borrowing and lending abroad. The attempt
to preserve fixed exchange rates through the interest-equalization tax,
restrictions on foreign investment by United States enterprises, and on
foreign lending by United States banks were even more important. Had
the United States cut completely the link with gold earlier and set the
dollar free to float, the Eurodollar market would never have attained
its present scale. New York, not London would have been the center of
world finance and the United States would probably never have drifted
into so unsatisfactory an international financial position. Here again,
the banking community must bear much of the blame for developments
that proved so adverse to its interests. With the notable exception of
Walter Wriston, leading bankers were all strong proponents of fixed
exchange rates and lobbied for their retention—which meant they also
lobbied, though not explicitly, for exchange control.
Benjamin Friedman quite properly emphasizes the growth of private
debt and the decline in the ratio of corporate equity to debt. The mys-
tery to me is why debt did not grow still more rapidly under the double
spur of tax advantages and the inflation-induced availability of long-
term funds at a negative real rate. Individuals and enterprises that bor-
rowed at long term in nominal form have been the major private bene-
ficiaries from inflation. Why were so many so slow to take advantage
of the opportunity? The obvious answer is the inertia of the status quo,
the long time that it takes for the community at large to adjust its expec-
tations and its behavior to basic changes in its environment—alike a
major source of the appeal of inflation to fiscal and monetary authorities,
of the damage that inflation does, and of the difficulty of ending infla-
tion. Expectations may be rational, yet take a long time to adjust; mar-
kets may be efficient in the technical sense, yet prove highly imperfect
estimators of future values; it may not be possible to fool all the people
all the time, but it appears to be possible to do so for a surprisingly
long time.
An unanticipated consequence of the greatly expanded role of govern-
ment on both income and capital account has been a return of the cycli-
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First World War, long-term interest rates typically peaked well after the
peak of the business cycle—around mid-recession—and reached their
trough well after the cyclical trough—around mid-expansion. This oc-
curred because of the importance of railroad bonds issued to finance
extensions of track. Once an extension was started, it was generally
expedient to complete it even if business conditions softened. A down-
turn in the cycle brought a postponement of new track extensions but
meant a higher rather than lower demand for bond finance to complete
the extensions under way, since there was a decline in current revenues
accompanying the constant, or for a time even growing, requirement for
capital. As the extensions were completed the demand for finance ebbed,
reinforcing the decline in demand elsewhere, and producing by mid-
recession a decline in interest rates. Similarly, during an expansion, there
was a delay before new track extensions were approved and moved
from paper plans to actual construction, so that the demand for finance
did not pick up sharply until about mid-expansion.
Since the end of the Second World War the government has increas-
ingly been playing the role that the railroads played earlier as a dom-
inant and lagging element in the market for long-term bond finance.
After a cyclical downturn, government demand increases as earlier com-
mitments mature, spending rises on unemployment insurance and similar
countercyclical programs, and current tax revenues decline. Interest
rates decline only after demand from other sources has fallen enough
to offset the higher government demand. A similar sequence in the re-
verse direction occurs during expansions.
A major institutional change that is still mostly in bud is the wide-
spread indexation of financial contracts for inflation. The shortening of
debt periods, floating interest rates, and variable-rate mortgages are all
signs of the demand for indexing. An even more dramatic sign is the
retreat from financial assets to physical assets—to land, houses, antiques,
jewelry, gold, and silver—and the explosive rise in the prices of such
assets.
There have been two major obstacles to the issuance of inflation-
adjusted securities by private enterprises: first, their ability to borrow
at negative real rates of interest through traditional channels; and sec-
ond, the absence of indexing in the tax structure so that payments to
lenders to allow for inflation would not be treated as taxable interest
or capital gains. The major obstacle to the issuing of inflation-adjusted
liabilities by financial intermediaries is the absence of corresponding
assets to serve as their counterpart in the balance sheet.
If the inflationary roller coaster continues, these obstacles will disap-
pear. Nominal interest rates will rise sufficiently to give a positive real
yield; the pressure to index the tax system is strong and will become
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obligations, which could serve as the counterpart to inflation-adjusted
liabilities of financial intermediaries.
Conclusion
I am not nearly so confident now about the longer range future as I
was a quarter of a century ago. At that time, the initial stage of a long
trend had been passed, so the direction was clear, but the trend was still
in its early stages, so it could be expected to continue for a long time.
Today that trend is old. It is generating countercurrents of opinion and
action. A turn is in the offing. But who knows just when it will occur?
As every forecaster is aware, as the Dow theory enshrines, picking turn-
ing points is the really hard part of the job.
The turn may come soon. A number of fortuitous circumstances, in-
cluding mistakes in monetary policy, have, I believe, increased the
possibility that 1979 or 1980 will prove the year when inflation peaked
in the United States, not in the sense that the inflation will thereafter
sink steadily and precipitously to zero, but in the sense that the infla-
tionary roller coaster will change from an upward to a downward trend.
In that case, while the trough of inflation in 1981 or 1982 will probably
be higher than the preceding trough in 1976, the next peak in the mid-
1980s will be lower than the 1979 or 1980 peak. Even if that optimistic
outlook is realized, the institutional changes—particularly the indexa-
tion of taxes and government borrowing—set in motion by the gradual
incorporation of inflationary expectations will continue, though they
may not reach full fruition. The continued changes will slow the adjust-
ment to a less inflationary environment—just as the earlier institutional
changes slowed the adjustment to accelerating inflation. The role of
commercial banks will continue to decline—though the decline may be
slowed by a reduction in regulation, particularly the elimination of Q;
forms of financial intermediation will continue to proliferate, and new
financial instruments will continue to be produced—all, on the initial
assumption, to respond to a vanishing problem.
While I now regard this scenario as more likely than I did even six
months ago, it still seems to me decidedly less likely than a continued,
and indeed even accelerating, upward trend of the roller coaster, with
the swings becoming shorter and wider. Inertia is strong. Objections to
inflation are weaker than they seem. All of us object to rises in the prices
of the things we buy; few of us object to rises in the prices of the things
we sell. All of us are eager to end inflation—provided it is done at some-
one else's expense.
Experience abroad, particularly in Japan and Great Britain, suggests
that inflation must reach a rate of something like 25 percent a year
before its destructive social effects become so visible, so widespread, as
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If that proves the case here, as I fear it will, inflation will come down
to perhaps something like 7-9 percent in 1981, and then rise to perhaps
15-20 percent by the mid-1980s. On this scenario, the upward swing of
the roller coaster still has another decade or so to run before it becomes
politically profitable to end it. That is not a pleasant prospect. However,
I do not share the views of those who believe that the outcome will be
a runaway hyperinflation (always of course excepting the outbreak of
major war, in which case, a wholly different range of possibilities would
emerge). The conditions for a hyperinflation are not present now and
are almost certainly not going to be present for the foreseeable future.
If the roller coaster does continue on its upward path for another
decade or so, the nascent changes in the financial institutions and ar-
rangements could go very far. By then, we shall be living in a financial
world where indexation is well-nigh universal for all but very short-
term contracts, where financial intermediation of all kinds is a sharply
declining industry. The financial markets will be highly efficient, but we
shall buy that market efficiency at the cost of physical inefficiency, wide-
spread social unrest, and political instability.
If we cannot long before then summon the political will to end the
inflation that only government produces and that only government can
end, we shall, in the famous words of Adam Smith, have "to endeavour
to accommodate ... to the real mediocrity of [our] circumstances."
Note
1. "Why the American Economy is Depression-Proof," a lecture delivered in
Stockholm in April, 1954. Reprinted in Milton Friedman, Dollars and Deficits
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 72-90, quotations from pp. 74,
75, 78, 89, and 90.
3.A.W. Clausen
The Changing Character of Financial Markets in the
Postwar Period: A Personal Perspective
Since the postwar period closely coincides with my own thirty years as
a commercial banker, my discussion of postwar changes in financial
markets will bear the stamp of that personal perspective.
I'll begin by reviewing developments from 1945 to 1960, a time
when: mutual funds, savings and loans, and insurance companies in-
vaded the backyard of a sedentary and overly cautious commercial bank-
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ing sector; the growth of consumer credit opened vast new markets to
financial institutions; and the worldwide dollar shortage came to an end
following the declaration in 1958 that major European currencies would
henceforth be convertible, paving the way for the rapid growth of trade
and multinational activity in the decades to come.
Next I will focus on the 1960s, a period characterized by a flurry of
activity and innovation among banks and other financial institutions,
including: the emergence of a number of new money market instruments;
the advent of liability management in banking; the integration of finan-
cial markets on an international scale; formation of one-bank holding
companies as vehicles for financial services diversification; and disturb-
ing trends involving our balance of payments and advancing inflation.
The 1970s, my third frame of reference, represents yet another dis-
tinct set of developments: the breakdown of the Bretton Woods and
Smithsonian agreements and the dramatically increased pressure on the
value of the dollar relative to other currencies and gold; the massive
recycling of petrodollars following a series of dramatic OPEC price
hikes; loan syndications—often for projects in developing countries—
of a scope far exceeding previous experience; highly volatile financial
markets in the United States and abroad; and a blurring of distinctions
between different types of United States financial institutions and be-
tween services offered by the financial and nonfinancial sectors.
When I first entered the financial world in 1949, widespread predic-
tions of a depression following World War II were giving way to opti-
mism as the peacetime economy entered an unprecedented period of
sustained economic growth. Output per man-hour nearly doubled during
the first half of the postwar period, providing the impetus for a 138
percent increase in the gross national product from 1945 to 1960. These
gains were facilitated by corresponding increases in American credit
markets. During the 1945-60 period, total debt grew 115 percent, to
$875 billion.
Not all financial institutions shared equally in the market's largess, of
course. Commercial banks, dominated for the most part by conservative
managements that were more interested in the size of balance sheet
totals than in earnings per share, failed to take full advantage of the
opportunities that arose following the war. Insurance companies, mutual
funds, savings and loans, and other institutions rushed in to fill the
vacuum. By 1960, the banking sector's share of total debt had slipped
almost three percentage points.
Savings and loan associations proved especially adept at cultivating
the mortgage field. Encouraged by pent-up demand immediately follow-
ing World War II and subsequently bolstered by government programs
such as the Federal National Mortgage Association, mortgage debt grew
at a substantial pace throughout the postwar period. From 1945 to 1960,
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The expansion of Bank of America's mortgage portfolio paralleled
this trend. However, most bankers were less eager to participate in the
market during the first half of the postwar period, preferring more
liquid assets. It wasn't until 1957 that the loan portfolios of commercial
banks finally surpassed their holdings of government securities.
Savings and loan associations, adopting a more aggressive stance,
doubled their share of the mortgage market during the postwar years.
By 1960, they held 29 percent of mortgage debt outstanding. This com-
pared with 20 percent for life insurance companies, 14 percent for
commercial banks, 13 percent for mutual savings banks, and 24 percent
for all other holders. Commercial banks were more successful in capital-
izing on growing demands for consumer installment loans, a relatively
young market. Excluding the portion served by retailers, these loans
expanded almost twentyfold from 1945 to 1960. The commercial bank
share of this $37 billion market had reached 45 percent by 1960.
Banks also began testing the credit card field in the early 1950s. Al-
though early attempts proved unprofitable, Bank of America established
a firm foothold in the market with the introduction of BankAmericard
in 1958.
However, in attracting time deposits, the savings and loan industry
clearly outperformed rival financial institutions during the 1950s. Until
the liberalization of Federal Reserve Regulation Q in 1960, commercial
banks had been steadily losing ground in this area. From 1945 to 1960,
their individual savings deposits increased only 124 percent, to $67 bil-
lion, while individual savings at savings and loans rose almost 750
percent, to $62 billion. Then Regulation Q was modified, allowing banks
to pay more competitive rates on savings and time deposits. In the years
that followed, commercial banks reversed the trend of previous years.
For example, they attracted 42 percent of the savings flow from 1960
to 1968, whereas the share going to savings and loans dropped to 26
percent. Life insurance companies, which garnered 31 percent of the
savings flow in the 1950s, slipped to a 17 percent share during the
1960-68 period.
The 1960s ushered in a host of other changes that provided banks
with new sources of funds, primarily "purchased money" available in
large volume at money market rates. As these funds made up an increas-
ingly sizable proportion of bank liabilities by the mid-1960s, the term
"liability management" quickly gained currency in financial circles. Car-
ried to its extreme, this concept suggested that banks no longer needed
to provide for liquidity in their asset mix. They could simply "buy" the
liabilities they needed to meet liquidity or loan demands.
With the introduction of new money market instruments, such as the
large denomination negotiable certificate of deposit, the growth of fed-
eral funds trading, and the burgeoning of the Eurodollar pool, commer-
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deposit sources—checking and savings accounts. Now they could turn
to purchased funds to satisfy the market's growing appetite for credit as
the economy boomed and inflation began mounting in the mid-1960s.
In the 1950s, the total assets of weekly reporting banks increased by
$51 billion, or 53 percent. The corresponding gain in the sixties was
$189 billion, a 128 percent jump. By 1970, commercial banking had
regained the market share that had been lost during the 1950s.
The dramatic expansion of credit markets in the 1960s coincided with
a merging of previously segmented markets and increasing innovation
within financial markets. For example, seekers of mortgage funds began
venturing beyond the confines of local and regional markets to tap the
capital markets. At the same time, household savings also became more
mobile, moving from deposit institutions to bond markets and other
sectors returning higher yields.
In search of more funds at lower interest rates, corporations also
turned increasingly to the money markets, bypassing financial interme-
diaries. From 1966 to 1969, when the average prime rate increased from
5.2 to 8 percent, the commercial paper market almost tripled—from
$13 billion to $32 billion. Bankers and corporate managements both
soon learned that "money for hire" has only one allegiance: It goes to
the highest bidder offering the least risk. It was quickly dubbed "hot
money," and more than once overly dependent banks were burned by it.
Another innovation with far-reaching consequences was the forma-
tion of one-bank holding companies that began in 1967 and soon be-
came a vogue. In fact, so popular was this new concept that in the space
of but a year, one-bank holding companies grew from almost nothing to
encompass one quarter of the total banking assets in the United States.
The congeneric was banking's answer to insurance lenders, captive fi-
nance companies, and giant corporations that had been trespassing on
the traditional turf of banks. It provided an avenue for bank expansion
into new fields without running afoul of the Justice Department. How-
ever, legislation passed in 1970 curbed bankers' exuberance by re-
stricting operations of one-bank holding companies to specific activities
closely related to finance.
Although our subject is American financial markets, many of the
forces at work in the United States must be analyzed in a global context.
Indeed, the interdependency of international finance had become appar-
ent to American business and financial leaders in the early 1950s. To
provide a forum for discussion of major economic, monetary, and fiscal
issues affecting the international banking community, the American
Bankers Association hosted the first International Monetary Conference
in 1954. Initially, the conference brought together chief executive offi-
cers of the 50 largest United States banks and 12 to 15 bankers of equal
rank from abroad as well as central bank and government officials. The
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1970, the by-laws were changed to make the International Monetary
Conference (IMC) a truly international body. The membership has
been broadened considerably in the last decade. It currently comprises
116 banks from 23 countries.
The rapid internationalization of finance was powered by two major
developments of the 1960s: (1) the dramatic surge of foreign activity
by United States-based multinationals; and (2) attempts by the Amer-
ican government to staunch the flow of dollars leaving the country.
Because the dollar was overvalued in the 1960s, United States firms
found that foreign markets offered extremely attractive investment op-
portunities. During the latter half of the decade, United States direct
foreign investment increased rapidly, mounting to $76 billion in 1970.
This compared with direct foreign investment in the United States of but
$13 billion.
Devaluations of the dollar in the early 1970s altered the pattern of
international investment. Since 1970, the rate of increase in foreign
investment in the United States has been outpacing United States invest-
ment abroad. At the end of 1978, it totaled nearly $41 billion, a 207
percent increase over the 1970 figure. During the same period, United
States direct investment abroad grew by 123 percent, to $168 billion.
Naturally, major American banks followed their customers overseas,
setting up foreign subsidiaries to service multinational accounts. Soon
these banks were deriving a sizable portion of their earnings from
abroad.
Except for a branch in London, Bank of America's operations were
confined almost exclusively to the United States until 1947. Even as late
as 1963, we had only 22 branches abroad. The ensuing years, however,
witnessed a phenomenal growth in our international activities. By the
end of 1970, our overseas network encompassed 100 branches, 8 repre-
sentative offices, and 61 subsidiaries and affiliates in 77 countries and
territories. Our international assets more than doubled between 1965
and 1970, when they totaled $8 billion. Income from our international
activities also climbed steeply, rising to 55 percent of BankAmerica
Corporation's profits by 1975. Since then, however, our foreign source
income has declined relative to domestic income.
Our shift toward a more international orientation reflected a pro-
found reordering of the global financial structure. In place of compart-
mentalized national markets, the world was entering an era of highly
integrated financial systems that overcame the old limitations imposed
by distance and political divisions. This metamorphosis placed the evolv-
ing transnational markets on a collision course with some national gov-
ernments, illustrating once again that changes in the financial environ-
ment owe as much to laws, regulations, and similar restraints as to the
basic forces of economics.91 Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets
In the mid-sixties, the United States government began introducing
monetary controls aimed at arresting some disturbing trends in the na-
tional economy. The inflationary spiral that began its ascent in 1965
was showing little sign of responding to treatment. This, plus the increas-
ing flow of capital abroad and deterioration of the nation's formerly very
positive balance of trade, compounded United States balance of pay-
ments problems. The nation's official reserve transactions moved from
a modest surplus in 1966 to a $3.6 billion deficit in 1967. The following
year the situation worsened further as a result of Britain's devaluation
of the pound late in 1967, which triggered a run on the dollar. The
flight to gold caused the Federal Reserve to tighten voluntary foreign
credit restraints and invoke other controls, notably the interest equaliza-
tion tax.
Instead of keeping dollars at home, these moves by the government
acted as a catalyst for the extraordinary development of the Eurodollar
market. During a nine-year period of increasing controls that ended in
1974, Eurodollars grew twelvefold, to a gross size of $370 billion. Since
then, the market has continued to increase at an average annual rate of
20 to 25 percent.
Ironically, it was this unregulated pool of funds—and the free market
mechanism surrounding it—that enabled the international monetary sys-
tem to rise to the challenge posed by the quintupling of oil prices in
1974. No official mechanism then in place could have resolved the im-
balances caused by such an action. The Eurocurrency markets offered
the private banking system the flexibility needed to engineer the greatest
transfer of financial assets in history with an efficiency that dazzled even
supporters of the Euromarkets.
Another, less publicized benefit of these markets is their effect on
developing countries. Since they emerged, the Third World has had
much greater access to adequate funding for viable projects. The ques-
tion for the 1980s is what changes will occur in the financial markets in
order to accommodate the ever-increasing need in the non-oil-producing
Third World to finance the debt burdens caused by higher oil prices and
inflation. In 1969,1 signed a $245 million syndicated loan for a venture
in Papua New Guinea that attracted considerable attention as the then
largest privately financed project in history. Today, projects costing bil-
lions of dollars are almost commonplace. Much of the funding for these
massive projects in the seventies came from the Eurocurrency markets.
A discussion of financial markets in the 1970s would be incomplete
without reference to four other developments: (1) concern about over-
extension of banks following the growth spurt of the sixties; (2) the
increasing volatility of markets; (3) the breakdown of the Smithsonian
and Bretton Woods accords; and (4) a blurring of distinctions within
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The go-go growth of commercial banks made possible by liability
management was a mixed blessing. While effectively meeting rising de-
mands for credit, the rapid expansion of loans and investments in the
early 1970s could not continue for long without proportionate additions
to equity capital. Balance sheets of commercial banks soon began show-
ing signs of strain. During the first three years of the decade, the assets
of major banks expanded at a rate of 15 percent, well above the 9 per-
cent growth of the 1960s. As a result, at the end of 1973, equity capital
equaled only 6.5 percent of total bank assets, a considerable decline
from 9 percent at the end of 1960. The closure of the United States
National Bank of San Diego in 1973, followed by the demise of Frank-
lin National and the international reverberations of the Bankhaus Her-
statt failure, further escalated concerns over the soundness of the banking
system in this country and abroad.
Against this backdrop, Bank of America adopted a policy of self-
restraint in the summer of 1974. In two years, our total assets had risen
by more than $15 billion, a gain of 45 percent. And our loan assets had
grown by more than 55 percent! Expansion at such a headlong rate
clearly could not continue. As a result, we chose to emphasize quality
of assets and sustainable growth of earnings over growth for growth's
sake. This strategy served us well during the 1974-75 recession and in
succeeding years. Other institutions also recognized the need for con-
trolled growth and have adopted similar courses of action.
The return to a more conservative management philosophy led to a
gradual erosion in the credit market share of commercial banks during
the remainder of the decade, paving the way for more active participa-
tion by other intermediaries—especially savings and loans and foreign
investors.
Another distinguishing feature of the 1970s is the volatility that in-
fected national and international financial markets during this period.
Devaluations of the dollar, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods and
Smithsonian agreements, continued high rates of inflation—these and
other developments served to undermine confidence in the dollar and en-
courage speculation.
On the national level, the prime rate offers a useful reference point.
From 1934 to 1970, the prime changed thirty-four times, about once a
year on the average. Compare this with the three-year period beginning
in 1973, when the prime rate changed no less than sixty-six times, or
the fifteen changes that occurred in 1979.
Finally, the seventies represented a move away from compartmental-
ized financial services in the United States and toward a more efficient,
nationwide financial market. In the process, we have seen a blurring of
the distinctions that traditionally separated competitors within the mar-
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firm, has developed a Cash Management Account that bears a striking
resemblance to a checking account paying a money market rate of in-
terest.
Thanks to pass-through certificates, the mortgage instrument is now
relatively marketable. In addition, savings and loan associations are
offering construction loans and variable-rate mortgages, as well as hous-
ing-related consumer loans. And they can draw funds, when necessary,
from the Federal Home Loan Banks. In short, they are becoming more
and more like commercial banks.
The desire of savers to receive realistic interest rates has prompted a
rush to money market mutual funds and six-month money market cer-
tificates. In 1979, for example, the volume of MMCs outstanding more
than tripled, exceeding $100 billion by year-end.
And nonfinancial enterprises have been staking out larger claims in
financial markets. Sears, Roebuck and Co., for example, earned almost
as much from its financial services in 1978 as BankAmerica Corpora-
tion. This year Sears intends to go yet another step. To meet some of
its capital requirements, it will offer Sears credit card customers an
opportunity to buy intermediate term notes through a wholly owned
subsidiary.
These and other rumblings in the marketplace portend a shift toward
an integrated network that is increasingly efficient at mobilizing and
transferring financial resources. Indeed, we already have a nationwide
financial services industry on the wholesale level, and I'm convinced it's
only a matter of time until the United States has interstate retail bank-
ing as well. Electronic funds transfer capabilities and an increasingly
mobile population will eventually bring irresistible pressure to bear on
the prohibition against interstate banking.
Whatever the future holds, we can be sure there will be no lack of
challenges to test the ingenuity, mettle, and resilience of financial mar-
kets and the intermediaries that serve them. Chief among these chal-
lenges is inflation, which is saddling our economy with a mounting
burden of debt and threatening to widen the gap between real gross
national product and total credit outstanding. To accommodate demands
for future credit and other financial services, financial institutions can
be expected to create additional instruments and techniques that will
whittle away the remaining impediments to a free flow of funds. Increas-
ing competition, in turn, will produce narrower spreads and greater
profit pressures.
In my opinion, this type of environment will favor the consolidation
of financial intermediaries, resulting in larger, more diversified institu-
tions that command the resources and leadership qualities required to
survive and prosper in an uncertain marketplace. But legislative and
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rough and largely uncharted terrain we've traversed during the past
thirty years, I have no doubt that tomorrow's financial systems will be
more than adequate to deal with the inevitable future shocks of decades
to come. Indeed, the message of the entire postwar period is abundantly
clear: Markets will be served. And being terribly prejudiced, I have a
personal preference for an active role for the commercial banking in-
dustry.
Summary of Discussion
The discussion turned to a number of issues, including the puzzle of
low equity and bond yields in an inflationary environment, the changing
role of the commercial banks, the growing importance of international
constraints in money management, and the role of bank regulation. On
the first, Paul Samuelson declared that the greatest puzzle in the area
of finance in the past thirty years has been the failure of common stocks
to provide an effective inflation hedge. In life-cycle terms, the lower real
total yield on equity has substantially raised the real cost of retirement.
Samuelson noted a further puzzle in the consistently negative real return
to debt in recent years and wondered about the connection between the
debt and equity yields. He indicated that Professor Modigliani of M.I.T.
claims that both negative yields reflect money illusion of investors, who
discount stock prices at the nominal interest rate. Even if the market is
vastly inefficient at processing nominal versus real yields, an individual
investor may have no way to arbitrage the market error.
Martin Feldstein offered another explanation for low equity and bond
yields. The interaction of inflation with the tax rules on depreciation
allowances, nominal capital gains, and inventories has lowered the post-
tax real rate of return to capital, and therefore the return to equity
holders. Low bond yields reflect traditional differentials with equity
yields. Walter Wriston declared that the poor performance of stock
prices since 1964 reflects an increasingly hostile business environment,
with growing regulations and tax burdens. Arthur Okun added that the
growing uncertainties about economic performance have led rational
investors to bid down equity prices. Okun also joined Feldstein in the
view that investors correctly view the combination of taxes and inflation
as an effective levy on capital.
Wriston addressed the great changes in the role of commercial banks
during the past thirty years. Commercial banks hold a declining share
of United States financial assets. In 1946, commercial banks held 57
percent of financial assets in the United States. At the end of 1980, they
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ward trend will continue. For example, Sears is beginning to sell com-
mercial paper directly to credit card holders. And while there are 700
million credit cards in America, the commercial banks have less than
15 percent of the cards. General Electric credit will earn more than the
Wells Fargo banks, and Sears financial division will earn more in 1980
than Sears retailing. Indeed the entire system of intermediation is mov-
ing dramatically away from banks. Wriston declared that the electronic
management of funds now allows corporations to maintain nearly zero
cash balances and pointed out that the net demand deposits of the clear-
inghouse banks in New York have not increased in nominal terms in the
past five years. Finally, Wriston noted that ten years ago, eight of the
world's ten largest banks were resident in the United States. At the end
of 1979, there were only three here.
James O'Leary and Arthur Burns suggested that growing world cap-
ital mobility and flexible exchange rates have made United States mone-
tary policy increasingly hostage to international events. In coming years,
O'Leary predicted, the Federal Reserve Board will not aggressively ease
credit in a recession because of fears of large capital outflows and ex-
change rate depreciation. Milton Friedman, however, was skeptical of
this view. He held that monetary policy is freer from international
constraints now than under fixed rates. In Friedman's view, the Federal
Reserve Board has recently justified its policies on the basis of interna-
tional events for political convenience rather than as a matter of sub-
stance. Friedman said that our main international vulnerability, the
dependence on imported oil, is a self-inflicted burden. Our regulations
restricting domestic production have made us the "unpaid agents" of
OPEC.
On the matter of bank regulation, Burns and Clausen pointed to the
difficulties in effecting needed deregulation and reform. Clausen attrib-
uted much of the problem to the divergences of interest among small
and large banks in the Federal Reserve System in a system in which all
banks have an equal vote on changes in regulations. This has shown up
in the divergence of views concerning the elimination of Regulation Q,
which many small-town banks have ardently fought.
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